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Abstract 
 
What drives private investment in a country is a question of paramount importance to both 
researchers and policy makers. Additions to a country’s private capital stock help drive 
both faster growth and faster wealth creation, which often creates many positive spillover 
effects for a country’s populace. In a study of twenty-two developing countries over a total 
of 660 country-year observations utilizing vector error correction models, this report found 
preliminary evidence that public capital stock growth positively caused growth in future 
values of the private capital stock in a country. Additionally, this study found that changes 
in the level of the population and changes in the strength of political institutions also caused 
changes in the level of the stock of private capital in a developing country. Tentative causal 
evidence also existed for changes in the domestic credit to the private sector as a share of 
GDP, financial openness, and the size of the economy causing changes in the stock of 
private capital in a country. Policy makers in developing countries should focus future 
efforts on improving the quality of their institutions and providing high quality 
infrastructure, both traditional and social, if they want to help increase their country’s 
private capital formation and, consequently, growth. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
While it is commonly understood that investment is one of the major drivers of growth in 
both developing and advanced economies around the world, the question of what drives 
investment is much less well understood. This is especially the case for developing 
economies, where it is an arguably even more salient issue than for advanced economies. 
As many developing and advanced economies have seen investment decline in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis due to both endogenous and exogenous 
developments, this question is increasingly important in order to avoid the onset of 
hysteresis and the damaging idling of workers who could otherwise be employed 
productively. If governments are able to tailor their policies and priorities to best meet the 
needs of private sector actors, this would aid in both catching up from any lost growth 
experienced during the past half-decade-plus and maximize growth going forward.  
 
Even though total investment was basically flat globally during the previous four years 
(2010-13) compared to the four years before that (2006-09), there has been a wide 
divergence between investment trends in advanced and developing economies since 2008. 
In advanced economies investment as a share of GDP reached a cyclical peak in 2007. 
Since that time, when investment represented 22.6% of advanced economies’ GDP, 
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investment declined to 19.7% in 2013. 
By contrast, investment went from 
29.5% of emerging economies’ GDP 
in 2007 to 32.8% in 2013. Among the 
regions, growth was swiftest in 
developing Asia over that time period, 
with investment going from 37.4% of 
GDP in 2007 to 43.5% in 2013. By 
contrast, Euro Area investment 
cratered. It went from 22.7% of GDP 
to 17.9%. Among the other developing regions, Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment share of 
GDP increased by nearly 1%-point, but the investment share of GDP declined in other 
developing regions. Investment in Central and Eastern Europe experienced notable 
declines, going from 24.7% of GDP in 2007 to 20.5% in 2013. While the investment share 
of GDP in North American and advanced Asian economies declined on average, the 
declines were much less than the one seen in the Eurozone. Although developing Asia and, 
to a lesser extent, Sub-Saharan Africa, have set themselves up for solid growth in output 
going forward, most other regions in the world have taken a step back. Even Asia’s growth 
outlook, fueled in part by a large increase in debt in China, is filled with potential 
headwinds despite the uptick in investment given the legitimate questions about the quality 
of the investments that occurred in recent years. 
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This recent decline in investment followed a decade of tremendous investment in 
infrastructure facilities that coincided with a strong period of growth in private investment 
in developing economies following a relatively weak period of growth during the 1990s. 
Global electricity generation capacity increased by 86% between 1990 and 2010, with the 
average annual rate of growth accelerating by 65% after 2000 compared to before then. 
The global paved road network increased by 43% over the two-plus decades, with annual 
average growth jumping from 1.0% during the first half of the study to 2.6% during the 
second half. Port traffic increased by 560% over this time period, with growth remaining a 
robust 8.2% during the second half of the study’s sample period. Although the global rail 
network increased by just 8% during the two-plus decades, average annual growth was 
1.4% during the second half of the study compared to an annual contraction of 0.6% during 
the first half. The number of households with access to improved sanitation facilities 
jumped by 84% over that same period of time, and the number of households with 
improved water facilities rose by 70%. Growth was relatively evenly distributed over the 
two halves for both types of connections. The growth rate of many telecommunications-
related assets was quite robust during the 2000s with the exception of fixed telephone lines, 
and there were over 5 billion mobile telephone subscriptions around the world at the 
beginning of this decade. During this period of expansion of traditional infrastructure 
projects, private investment in developing economies increased dramatically. With some 
assumptions and extrapolation, the annual growth rate of private gross fixed capital 
formation—also known as investment—jumped from 5.9% between 1990 and 2000 to 
14.5% between 2000 and 2010. 
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This study aims to contribute to the literature on the subject by investigating what 
determines the level of private investment in developing economies through a vector 
autoregression-based analysis of nearly twenty-five such economies over the last four 
decades. Specifically, this study’s goal is to determine if there is a causal relationship 
between public and private investment. A great debate has emerged within academic circles 
concerning whether infrastructure investment, traditionally the province of the state for 
many developing economies, crowds out or complements private investment. The findings 
from this study hopefully shed preliminary insight into optimal conditions for the building 
of a country’s private capital stock and how policy actions can be geared toward creating 
a growth-maximizing environment in the future. The specific policy recommendations 
vary dramatically depending on the answers to the questions posed by this report.  
 
This report differs from many existing studies on this subject in five important respects. 
First, most previous studies on this subject analyze the question of whether infrastructure 
investment—or a commonly-used proxy such as gross public fixed capital formation—
affects a country’s output. Second, many prior studies have explored the issue of the effect 
of public investment spending on private investment or an economy’s overall level of 
output by looking at the rates of growth of these variables as opposed to changes in the 
levels of the stock forms of these variables. Thirdly, a decided majority of these studies 
have utilized panel data analysis econometric techniques in order to answer the key 
questions. Fourth, of the studies that have utilized time-series analysis econometric 
techniques, the studies generally confined themselves to exploring the effect of public 
investment spending on private investment spending or overall output of just a single 
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country. Fifth, most time-series-based analyses look at the relationship between public and 
private capital on a contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous relationship. This study’s 
novelty lies in the fact that it explores the link between public investment and private 
investment, it utilizes stocks of private and public capital, it uses time-series econometric 
techniques, it evaluates the effect of public capital stock growth on private capital stock 
growth for nearly two dozen countries, and it looks at the lagged effects between public 
capital and private capital formation.  
 
This study analyzes these issues in the following order. Chapter two examines previous 
academic and non-academic literature on the importance of public gross fixed capital 
formation in affecting private investment growth rates and levels over time. Chapter three 
evaluates the evolution of many traditional infrastructure assets in the energy, 
transportation, water and sanitation, and telecommunications sectors, which in general 
remain the province of the public sector for the sorts of middle and low income countries 
that this study analyzes. Chapter four details the methodology used in answering the 
overarching question of this thesis. Chapter five presents the results of causality tests for 
the over twenty countries that this study looks at in terms of whether changes in the level 
of the stock of the universe of potential explanatory variables leads to changes in the level 
of the stock of private capital. The findings from this chapter will be incorporated in chapter 
six, which investigates whether the additional public capital formation crowds-in or 
crowds-out private capital formation once other causal explanatory variables are controlled 
for in the models. This study concludes in chapter seven with analysis of these findings 
and the policy implications that are derived from them. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Infrastructure investment’s role in driving growth has experienced a renaissance of interest 
within academic circles during the past twenty-five years. In recent decades, the primary 
line of inquiry was determining if infrastructure investment had a positive effect on output 
growth in different types of economies. David Aschauer revitalized interest in this subject 
in the late 1980s with his seminal paper on the subject of the relationship between 
infrastructure investment and economic growth in 1989, which estimated the elasticity of 
total factor productivity to infrastructure investment was 0.34 in the United States.  
 
There are a variety of underlying theories that motivate researchers into analyzing whether 
infrastructure investment has a positive or negative effect on an economy’s output growth 
rate. A number of studies, most notably Calderon, Moral-Benito, and Serven (2011), 
Canning and Pedroni (2004), and Shioji (2001), attempt to include infrastructure 
investment and/or public capital as an explanatory variable in an aggregate production 
function with overall output as the explained variable and various specifications of physical 
and human capital as the other explanatory variables. Romp and de Haan (2005) review 
some of the other major theoretical frameworks employed by researchers when analyzing 
the effect that infrastructure investment has on output growth. There have also been many 
researchers who have utilized the cost-function approach—including Demetriades and 
Mamuneas (2000)—when analyzing the effect of infrastructure investment on output 
growth. A good portion of this interest is due to the fact that the production-function 
approach violates standard marginal productivity theory, whereas cost-function approaches 
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sidestep this violation by assuming that public capital/infrastructure is a free input 
externally provided by the government. In these models, the question is whether public 
capital reduces costs for firms that allows them to increase overall output in an economy 
during their profit-maximization process. Additionally, a number of researchers, including 
Kamps (2004), have attempted to investigate this subject by using vector autoregression 
models. The advantage of these models is the lack of a priori assumptions concerning 
causality and the fact that explained and explanatory variables can be jointly determined. 
 
While Aschauer may have renewed interest in the subject matter, he was certainly not the 
first researcher to investigate the relationship between government spending/infrastructure 
and GDP growth. Barro (1980) found that although defense purchases had a large positive 
effect on output growth in the United States, the effect of non-defense purchases on output 
growth could not be determined. By contrast, Eberts (1986) found that the public capital 
stock had a statistically significant positive influence on the growth of manufacturing 
output in different metropolitan areas around the country, although the economic effects of 
public capital were smaller than those for private capital and labor.  
 
As the relationship between infrastructure investment and growth was investigated by other 
researchers after Aschauer with more advanced econometric techniques, larger 
longitudinal samples, and additional countries, a general consensus eventually emerged 
that investment in infrastructure is associated with materially improved growth rates, if 
smaller than the impact estimated by Aschauer. In general, the elasticity of output growth 
with respect to infrastructure investment ranges between 0.08 and 0.22 in studies that 
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investigate more than one country at a time, with every additional unit of infrastructure 
investment boosting output by an additional 0.08 to 0.22 units. These results indicate that 
a 10% increase in infrastructure investment is associated with a 0.8% to 2.2% marginal 
increase in GDP. Romp and Haan (2005) reviewed over fifty of the academic studies 
investigating a link between infrastructure investment and either growth or welfare since 
Aschauer’s initial study. Of the fifty-three studies that directly attempt to answer the 
question, forty-four of them found that infrastructure investment had a positive effect on 
growth or welfare. Of the remaining studies, five could not find conclusive evidence of any 
effect while four found that infrastructure investment had a negative effect on growth. 
Calderon, Moral-Benito, and Serven (2011) found that the long-run elasticity of output 
with respect to infrastructure stock ranged between 0.07 and 0.10. These results indicate 
that a 10% increase in infrastructure investment is associated with a 0.7%-1.0% marginal 
increase in GDP. 
 
Sanchez-Robles (1998) analyzed any possible effects that infrastructure investment has on 
economic output through the use of physical infrastructure assets—such as kilometers of 
road network, electric capacity, rail network, etc.—as a proxy for infrastructure 
endowment. The advantage of this particular form of measuring infrastructure’s effect on 
output growth is that it helps delink inflated construction costs resulting from corruption 
from the investment necessary to simply build the physical asset itself. This method allows 
for a purer measure of the effect infrastructure investment has on GDP growth. This study 
found that infrastructure investment had a positive impact on developing country’s GDP 
growth rates.  
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While most studies on the effects of infrastructure investment on output growth lump new 
investment in with maintenance spending on existing infrastructure assets, Rioja (2003) 
separated the two components of infrastructure investment and produced some novel 
findings. Rioja’s analysis found that developing economies can maximize infrastructure 
investment’s positive effects on output growth when 2% of GDP is devoted to such 
spending. His study found that most Latin American countries fell below this optimal 
allocation during the course of his study. 
 
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) further advanced research into the variety of ways that 
infrastructure investment can influence growth rates by emphasizing the effect that 
institutions played on GDP growth and the effectiveness of government policy. In 
particular, the researchers found that once institutions and infrastructure investment are 
controlled for, and accounting for the simultaneity between infrastructure investment and 
GDP, infrastructure investment had a “substantial” impact on GDP growth rates. The two 
researchers also found that credible and effective institutions play an important role in 
determining the effectiveness of infrastructure investment. 
 
While there may be specific niches that have not yet been fully examined within the 
relationship between infrastructure investment and output growth, most of the pertinent 
questions appear to have been investigated based on the accumulated research to date on 
the subject. 
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A decidedly smaller minority of studies have examined the role that infrastructure 
investment plays in driving private investment. Many to most of these studies focus on the 
question of whether public investment “crowds out” private investment. These studies 
generally measure public and private investment in terms of flows—i.e. growth rate—as 
opposed to stocks—i.e. the level of public capital. Additionally, until recently, the 
questions were primarily answered with panel data techniques, such as fixed effects, 
random effects, pooled OLS, and two-stage least squares instrumental variable regressions, 
which will be discussed in detail later on in this study. The key question in this debate is 
whether the positive effect on the profit function of increasingly productive public capital 
outweighs the negative effect of crowding-out of private investment with each additional 
unit of public investment. Most of these studies focus on contemporaneous relationships 
between public and private investment. The studies to date have failed to yield a definitive 
consensus on which effect dominates.  
 
The underlying theoretical frameworks that motivate analyzing the relationship between 
public capital and private capital are similar to those that motivate analyzing the 
relationship between public capital and overall output growth. Hatano (2010) is one of 
many researchers who utilize a production function approach to undergird theories of how 
public capital could increase or decrease the accumulation and/or effectiveness of private 
capital. As alluded to previously, for aggregate production function-based studies the 
models in these studies attempt to determine whether the positive effect on the profit 
function of increasingly productive public capital outweighs the negative effect of 
crowding-out of private investment with each additional unit of public investment. In 
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certain cases, the authors will still utilize VAR/VECM models, but the underlying theories 
behind the creation of the models is still motivated by an aggregate production function 
framework. Additionally, cost/profit function models are employed by many researchers, 
including Bosca, Escriba, and Murgui (2000). These types of studies attempt to determine 
whether public capital makes new incremental private investment more or less profitable. 
If the answer is “more profitable”, private firms will invest more and increase the private 
capital stock. Finally, a number of researchers, including Mittnik and Neumann (2001), 
employ vector autoregression and/or vector error correction models when exploring this 
subject. 
 
Of the studies that examine the question of the relationship between public and private 
infrastructure investment, there are a number of studies that examine this question with 
panel data analysis techniques. Erden and Holcombe (2005) found evidence that a 10% 
increase in public investment is associated with a 2% increase in private investment in 
developing economies, but that there is evidence of crowding-out in advanced economies. 
Oshikoya (1994) examined the determinants of private investment of various middle 
income and low income African countries between 1970 and 1988, and his pooled OLS 
results indicated that there was a complementary relationship between public and private 
investment among both groups of countries, although the relationship was more 
economically significant among middle income African countries. His examination of the 
relationship within individual countries pointed to a need to ensure that types of public 
investment pursued were productive, but caution is necessary in drawing too sweeping of 
conclusions from such a small relative sample size. Greene and Villanueva (1991) pooled 
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cross section analysis of the determinants of private sector investment among developing 
economies between 1975 and 1987 also found a complementary relationship between 
public and private investment.  
 
Aschauer (1989) discovered evidence of a crowding-in relationship between public and 
private investment in the United States. Lora (2007) discovered evidence of crowding-in 
between private and public investment in many Latin American countries between the late 
1980s and early 2000s. Mitsui, Takezawa, and Kawachi (1995) found evidence of a 
crowding-in relationship as well. 
 
By contrast, Cavallo and Daude (2008) found through their analysis of 116 developing 
countries between 1980 and 2006 that a crowding-out effect was present across most 
regions and time. Good governance, strong institutions, and financial and trade openness 
ameliorate the crowding-out effects and in certain instances allowed a crowding-in 
relationship to develop. Pradhan, Ratha, and Sarma (1988) also found that a crowding-out 
effect exists between private and public investment in India, although overall investment 
levels were higher when public investment increases. Blejer and Khan (1984) discovered 
evidence of a complementary relationship regarding the level of public infrastructure 
investment in developing economies during the 1970s, but a crowding-out effect regarding 
changes in the level of investment from one year to the next in their panel data analysis. 
Everhart and Sumlinski (2001) also found evidence of crowding-out in developing 
countries, with the crowding-out being especially prevalent in countries with weak 
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institutions. Bairam and Ward (1993), Mondadjemi (1993), and Kataoka (2002) all found 
evidence of crowding-out as well. 
 
Hatano (2010) provides a template for innovative methods for determining whether a 
causal relationship exists between public and private investment in Japan in recent decades. 
Hatano employed two distinct innovations when attempting to answer the main question. 
First, he utilized time-series analysis techniques when evaluating the major question. 
Second, he attempted to answer the question by evaluating the relationship between the 
stock of public capital and the stock of private capital. His study found evidence of a 
crowding-in effect and two-way causal relationship. Ramirez (1994) found in his 
examination of Mexican data between 1950 and 1991 that lagged values of public 
investment had a statistically significant positive effect on private capital formation when 
utilizing time-series analysis techniques. Specifically, his findings indicated that a 10% 
increase in public investment generated a 2-3% increase in private investment one year 
later. Granger causality tests also confirmed the presence of a positive, causal relationship 
between public investment and future private investment. Erenburg (1993), Erenburg and 
Wohar (1995), Otto and Voss (1996) and Pereira (2001) found evidence of crowding-in 
with a VAR framework. Nakazato (2004) and Voss (2002) found no evidence that a 
crowding-in effect was present in the countries studied. 
 
Atukeren (2005) produced a study relatively similar to this one, although his study utilized 
a transfer function model in addition to the vector error correction model that is used in 
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this study. His study found that crowding-out effects were present in eleven of the countries 
studied whereas eight countries displayed some indications of a crowding-in effect. This 
study also found that private investment crowded-in public investment in eleven countries 
while it crowded-out public investment in just two countries. Nevertheless, Atukeren’ 
study analyzed many fewer lags of public infrastructure than this study does. Atukeren’s 
study echoed many others, including Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), in emphasizing the role 
that the quality of institutions plays in determining the effectiveness of infrastructure 
investment in an economy. 
 
Although any academic consensus is still best described as inchoate, the vector 
autoregression studies indicate that there is a crowding-out effect of public investment on 
private investment when contemporaneous values of each variable are controlled for. This 
makes sense in many regards, as there are a limited pool of funds for loans and any positive 
effects on private investment are unlikely to manifest themselves for a couple of years 
because of the lag time between the public investment, the public investment project 
coming on line, and any positive effect of improved private sector productivity potential as 
a result of a public works project.  
 
This study differentiates itself from other studies by building upon the methods and 
findings of previous researchers on this subject matter. In a fashion similar to Hatano 
(2010), it is motivated by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function framework, but 
analyzes the relationship between public and private capital using a vector error 
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correction model in order to account for any joint determination of the various variables 
controlled for in this study. This study is also unique in that it explicitly controls for and 
examines the lagged effects of public capital on private capital in order to more 
accurately and precisely determine the long-run effect of long-term investments. Finally, 
although a couple of other studies using vector-autoregression analysis, notably Atukeren 
(2005), have analyzed more than one country at a time, this study is different from most 
other studies analyzing the relationship between public capital and private capital by 
examining this relationship for dozens of individual countries instead of just one or two. 
This study is particularly unique in controlling for the same models for dozens of 
countries. Atukeren (2005) only examined an optimized model based on public capital 
lags. The unique combination of preexisting methods in a consistent framework provides 
novel insights into the relationship between public capital and private capital in 
developing economies.   
16 
 
CHAPTER 3: GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSET GROWTH 
 
Following a decade of weak growth 
between 1990 and 2000—
henceforth referred to as 1990s-plus 
for brevity’s sake—infrastructure 
investment increased dramatically 
throughout the global economy 
during the next ten years—
henceforth referred to as 2000s-plus. 
During the first period of time 
examined, annual GDP growth in 
the global economy averaged 2.8%. There were marked divergences in growth 
performance however. High income countries grew by 2.6%, middle income countries 
grew by 4.0%, and low income countries grew by 2.4%. Global growth slowed down 
during the next ten years to just  2.6%, but this was the result of growth in high income 
economies decelerating to just 1.7% due to the global financial crisis. Middle income 
annual real GDP growth accelerated to 6.0% and low income real GDP growth accelerated 
to 5.4%. Similarly, there was strong growth in investment in infrastructure components 
between the end of 2000 and 2010 compared to the previous ten years. The remainder of 
this study will attempt to determine whether there is a relationship between the increase in 
the rate of growth in infrastructure assets in the developing world and the increase in the 
GDP growth rate through an increase in private investment. 
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Figure 13. Real GDP Growth Rates by Development Type: 1990-
2013 
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Figure 14. Real GDP Growth Rates by Development Type: 1990-
2013 
Source: IMF 
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This chapter will review the growth in infrastructure endowments for four of the major 
forms of infrastructure: electricity capacity, water and sanitation connections, 
transportation networks, and telecommunication technology.  
 
These asset endowments—and later on values—were obtained using a bottom-up analysis 
of nearly every developing economy around the world. The values for water and sanitation 
connections, transportation networks, and telecommunication technology in this section 
were either obtained exclusively or in some part from data in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database. Electrical capacity values were obtained from the 
Energy Information Administration. Household size estimates used in water and sanitation 
connection estimates were obtained from the Global Market Information Database. 
 
For instances of missing data, two sets of procedures were employed. If there were between 
one and four years of missing asset endowment values data, the missing values were 
linearly interpolated.  
 
If there were five or more years of missing asset endowment values in a row, a more 
advanced interpolation process was employed. In these instances, the values were assigned 
based on the mean results of up to thirty simulations run in SAS’ multiple imputation 
procedure. The simulated values were created as a function of 4,708 country-year panel 
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observations for the asset values. The missing values were estimated as a function of the 
past and future values of the infrastructure endowment, long-term trend economic 
variables, governance quality variables, population variables, time variables, and regional-
income dummy variables. The mean value of the missing variables was then utilized as the 
endowment value going forward. Once the missing values were estimated, the total asset 
endowment was valued using current US dollars based on best practice per replacement 
unit estimate values that other studies had used previously. An extended description of this 
process can be found in Appendices A, B, and C.  
 
Electricity Capacity 
 
Possessing a sufficient base of resources and electrical capacity is one of the most 
important determinants of a country’s growth potential. A lack of adequate access to 
reliable sources of electricity both results in blackouts for consumers and businesses and 
negatively affects investment decisions for both foreign and domestic firms, especially for 
developing economies. Chontanawat, Hunt, and Pierse (2008) found that electricity 
consumption caused GDP growth in 70% of OECD economies and 46% of non-OECD 
economies between 1960 and 2000.  
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 Global energy capacity growth—
including both hydrocarbon-based 
and renewable—lagged global GDP 
growth during the first decade period 
of study, but then grew significantly 
faster during the second decade 
examined. Middle income countries 
drove this growth during both periods. 
Energy capacity expanded in high 
income countries by an average of 
1.5% per year during the first decade of study, which lagged real GDP growth in these 
countries, while capacity expanded by 2.3% between 2000 and 2010, which is a 35% faster 
growth rate than real GDP growth during this period. For the twenty-plus years examined, 
high income countries represented nearly two-fifths of overall capacity expansion. The 
United States alone represented over one-third of this expansion, and capacity expanded 
materially in Western Europe and Japan as well. Growth in all three countries/regions 
exceeded 40% for the period overall.  
 
Electricity capacity expansion was particularly robust in middle income countries after 
2000, with growth being especially strong after 2001. Capacity growth in the region during 
the 1990s-plus was 4.6%, and this growth rate accelerated to 6.7% during the 2000s-plus. 
Capacity growth exceeded real GDP growth during both periods of time. Overall, middle 
income countries represented over three-fifths of global electricity capacity expansion 
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Figure 4. Households with Sanitation Connection by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 Figure 3. Global Per Capita Electricity Capacity by 
Region: 1991-2010 
 
Figure 19. Global Per Capita Electricity Capacity by Region: 1991-
2010 
Source: World Bank, Author’s Calculations 
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during the twenty-plus year period of examination. Capacity tripled in these regions during 
these two-plus decades. Chinese capacity increased by 613% between the end of 1990 and 
2010, and it represented over one-third of global capacity expansion alone during this 
period of study. For comparison’s sake, China alone added more to global electrical 
capacity than the combined additions in the US, Western Europe, and Japan over the same 
period of time. Other middle income Asian countries represented another 12.5% of total 
global electrical capacity expansion during this period of time. Electrical capacity 
expansion in low income countries was particularly weak during this period of time, with 
capacity growing by just 2.7% during the two-plus decades of study. Interestingly, 
electrical capacity growth was much stronger in the 1990s-plus in low income countries 
than it was during the 2000s-plus. 
 
Water and Sanitation 
 
While the issue is of greater relevance for developing economies than for advanced 
economies, where access to water and sanitation facilities is at near universal levels in 
almost every country, the growth in water and sanitation connections is an important 
signifier of developing economies transitioning towards advanced economy standards of 
affluence.  According to Hutton and Haller (2004) at the World Health Organization, every 
$1 spent on improved sanitation facilities yields between $5 and $11 of economic benefits. 
Developing economies made remarkable strides towards increasing the share of their 
countries’ citizens with access to improved sanitation facilities—where none of humans, 
animals, or insects are exposed to the excreta—during the last two-plus decades. Over this 
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span of time the share of East Asian and Pacific countries with access to such facilities rose 
by 32%-points. The comparable increase in Latin America was 13%-points, and in the 
Middle East and North Africa it jumped by 15%-points. By income tiers, the share of 
middle income populations with access to improved sanitation facilities jumped from 44% 
in 1990 to 74% in 2010. For the corresponding share of households with access to improved 
water facilities, 92% of upper middle income households had access to such facilities in 
2010 while 87% of lower middle income countries had similar access. The distribution of 
gains in access in geographical terms were broadly similar to that which occurred with 
increasing access to improved sanitation facilities. 
 
This improvement in access to 
improved water and sanitation 
facilities involved significant  
investment by governments 
throughout the developing world 
between 1990 and 2010. In particular, 
the number of middle income 
households with access to improved 
sanitation facilities increased by 4.7% 
per year over the two-plus decade 
span of time. Unlike many other forms of infrastructure investment, however, sanitation 
investment decelerated in real connection terms during the decade starting in 2001 
compared to the prior decade.  
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Figure 20. Households with Sanitation Connection by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Figure 5. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
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Figure 21. Households with Sanitation Connection by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Figure 5. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Figure 22. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Figure 5. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 Figure 4. Households with Sanitation Connection by 
Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 23. Households with Sanitation Connection by Income Tier: 
Source: World Bank, GMID, Author’s Calculations 
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The share of the population in low income countries with access to improved sanitation 
facilities doubled between 1990 and 2010, going from 18% to 36%. Concerning access to 
improved water facilities, the share of the low income population with access to improved 
water facilities increased from 51% in 1990 to 66% in 2010. Additionally, the share of the 
population in middle income countries with access to improved sanitation facilities grew 
from under 37% in 1990 to nearly 60% by 2010. The share of the middle income population 
with access to improved water facilities jumped from 73% in 1990 to over 89% in 2010. 
The high income share of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities stayed 
in a relatively constant 95-96% ratio throughout these two-plus decades. Similarly, 98%-
99% of the high income population had access to improved sanitation facilities during these 
two-plus decades. 
 
Globally, sanitation connections grew faster than water connections during both the 1990s-
plus and the 2000s-plus, although this largely reflects the higher base of water connections 
prevalent in the global economy at the beginning of the period of examination. In 
particular, the number of households with improved sanitation connections grew by 3.1% 
per year during the twenty-one years of the study while water connections grew by 2.7%. 
For sanitation connections, annual growth during the first ten years of the study was 3.2% 
while it was 3.0% during the second decade. For water connections, growth during the first 
decade was 2.9%, but this figure dropped to 2.5% during the second decade. Growth in 
high income economies largely tracked household growth over this period of time, with 
new connections growing by 1.2% during each two sub-periods and for the twenty-plus 
year period overall. New water connections also grew by 1.2% during the second period 
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studied, but actually grew at a slightly faster annual rate of 1.4% during the 1990s-plus. In 
total, high income countries represented only approximately 16-17% of total growth in new 
water and sanitation connections during the twenty-year period. 
 
Middle income countries represented approximately three-quarters of the total growth in 
new sanitation and water connections over the previous two-plus decades. Similar to the 
trend seen in high income countries, average annual growth was swiftest during the 1990s-
plus compared to during the 2000s-plus. Annual new sanitation connections growth 
averaged 5.2% and annual new water 
connections growth averaged 3.7% 
during the 1990s-plus compared to 
4.1% and 2.9%, respectively, during 
the 2000s-plus. As was the case with 
many different forms of infrastructure 
investment, China led the way for 
growth in new water and sanitation 
connections. The country was 
responsible for 35% of new sanitation 
connections and 29% of new water connections during the two-decade-plus period. While 
new sanitation connection growth was relatively tepid in India over this period, the country 
comprised nearly 15% of total new sanitation connections across the world between 1990 
and 2010. There was also robust growth in new water and sanitation connections in other 
middle income countries in Asia as well. In a reversal of the trend from growth in electrical 
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Figure 25. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
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Figure 6. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Figure 5. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
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Figure 26. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 27. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 7. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 Figure 6. 
Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 Figure 5. 
Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 28. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Figure 5. Households with Water Connections by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Source: World Bank, GMID, Author’s Calculations 
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capacity, the annual growth rate in new water and sanitation connections accelerated during 
the 2000s-plus from the annual growth rate during the 1990s-plus, with annual growth in 
new sanitation connections jumping to 4.9% from 4.3% during the first period. Despite this 
robust growth, low income countries represented just 6.6% of new sanitation connections 
and 9.3% of new water connections over this period of time despite representing 16% of 
total population growth in the global economy. 
 
Transportation 
 
Infrastructure assets associated with the transportation sector—which include paved roads, 
railways, ports, and airports—showed divergent trends, with land-based assets growing 
weakly in the 1990s-plus and strong growth in the 2000s-plus, and seaport assets growing 
strongly during both the 1990s-plus and 2000s-plus. The sources of growth in terms of 
income tiers were remarkably different among the different forms of assets.  
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Middle income countries drove 
nearly three-quarters of the growth in 
paved road assets  between 1990 and 
2010, while high income countries 
were responsible for a little over one-
quarter of the growth and low income 
countries were essentially a non-
factor in this sphere. Nearly 80% of 
global paved roads were located in 
high income countries at the beginning of the 1990s and this share eroded to just five-
eighths in 2010. This was primarily driven by weak growth in the 1990s-plus, when the 
length of the paved road network declined marginally in high income countries before 
growing by an average of 1.5% per year between 2000 and 2010. Growth in Western 
European paved roads was stronger in the 1990s-plus while the length of the paved road 
network in North America grew strongly in the 2000s-plus. 
 
Among middle income countries, China and India dominated growth among these assets 
during the two-plus decade period. The two countries combined represented over 50% of 
total global growth in paved road stock during the two-plus decades. Other middle income 
countries in Asia also grew strongly while Middle Eastern and North African countries 
doubled their paved road network over the twenty-year-plus period. Paved road stock 
growth among middle income countries actually accelerated to 5.0% during the 2000s-plus 
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Figure 6. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 30. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 7. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 Figure 6. 
Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 31. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 7. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 32. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
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Figure 33. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 7. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 Figure 6. 
Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 34. Distribution of Paved Roads by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Source: World Bank, Author’s Calculations 
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compared to 4.4% during the 1990s-plus. Overall, paved road network grew by nearly 
150% among middle income countries during this twenty-year-plus period.  
 
Port assets and traffic grew the fastest of any type of infrastructure asset over the twenty-
year-plus period examined. Overall, port assets grew by 560% between 1990 and 2010, 
with growth split relatively evenly between high income and middle income countries. 
After just over 100 million TEUs 
(twenty-foot equivalent unit, which is 
an approximate measure of cargo 
shipped) of cargo was shipped 
annually in the early 1990s, nearly 530 
million TEUs were shipped in 2010. 
Among high income countries, growth 
was strongest in Western Europe and 
high income Asian countries 
excluding Japan over those twenty-
plus years. Annual growth was generally stronger in most high income countries and 
regions during the 1990s-plus compared to the 2000s-plus, with annualized growth slowing 
from 9.1% to 5.7%. High income countries were responsible for nearly 46% of growth in 
global port assets during these two-plus decades. 
 
 -
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
M
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
TE
U
s
High Mid Low
Figure 7. Total Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 35. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Figure 7. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 36. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 937. Ratio of Mobile Phone Subscriptions to Fixed 
Telephone Lines by Income Tier: 1995-2010 Figure 8. Distribution 
of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 Figure 7. Port Traffic by 
Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 38. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Figure 7. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 39. Port Traffic by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Source: World Bank, Author’s Calculations 
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Compound annual growth in middle income country port assets was a scintillating 15.4% 
per year on average between 1990 and 2010. China, not surprisingly, drove over half of 
middle income growth during this period, and had annual growth rates of 43% and 12% 
during the 1990s-plus and 2000s-plus, respectively. Other middle income Asian countries 
excluding India drove over 11% of total global growth during this period while middle 
income Latin American countries comprised nearly 7% of total global growth during this 
period. Overall, middle income countries drove around 53% of global growth in port assets 
and traffic during this twenty-year-plus period and represented around 48% of total 
assets/traffic by the beginning of the 2010s. Low income countries drove just 0.7% of total 
growth in global port traffic during this period. 
 
Rail assets in the form of functioning rail tracks were one of the few types of assets to see 
a decline in value over the course of the 1990s, and unlike most forms of infrastructure 
assets high income countries drove the majority of growth in asset formation between 1990 
and 2010. Between 1990 and 2000, annual growth in the length of the global rail network 
was -0.6% before rebounding to 1.4% between 2000 and 2010. High income countries were 
responsible for a little under two-thirds of the sector’s growth during this period, with North 
America driving more than 100% of total high income growth because of declines in 
practically every other major high income region outside of Australia over this twenty-one-
year period. Overall, high income rail stock grew by 8.6% during the twenty-year-plus 
period, and the share of total rail assets rose from 57.7% in 1990 to 58.2% during 2010. 
This was the only infrastructure subsector that saw a growth in the high income share of 
assets between 1990 and 2010. 
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Middle income rail networks grew by a little under 6% between 1990 and 2010, and 
expanded by a relatively robust 0.7% per year during the 2000s-plus. All told, middle 
income countries were responsible for 29% of the global growth in rail assets during this 
twenty-one-year period. Brazil drove 
most of the growth of rail assets in 
middle income countries, and  the 
network expanded by nearly twice as 
much in absolute terms as China 
between 1990 and 2010. Similar to its 
high income peers, the rail stock in 
middle income Eastern European 
countries contracted over this two-
plus decade sample. The rail network 
contracted in other middle income Latin American countries, India, and middle income 
Sub-Saharan African countries over the period of study as well. In terms of total growth 
between 1990 and 2010, low income countries actually grew their rail network the most of 
all three income tiers at 17.3% between 1990 and 2010. Given the low 3.4% of installed 
rail capacity at the beginning of the 1990s, however, the growth in low income rail network 
comprised just 7.5% of growth in the global rail network during the two-plus decades 
examined. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 940. Ratio of Mobile Phone Subscriptions to Fixed 
Telephone Lines by Income Tier: 1995-2010 Figure 8. Distribution 
of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
 
Figure 941. Ratio of Mobile Phone Subscriptions to Fixed 
Telephone Lines by Income Tier: 1995-2010 
 
Figure 42. Cumulative Share of Growth in New Broadband 
Connections by Income Tier: 2001-2010 Figure 943. Ratio of 
Mobile Phone Subscriptions to Fixed Telephone Lines by Income 
Tier: 1995-2010 Figure 8. Distribution of Rail Track by Income Tier: 
1990-2010 
 
Figure 944. Ratio of Mobile Phone Subscriptions to Fixed 
Telephone Lines by Income Tier: 1995-2010 Figure 8. Distribution 
of Rail Track by Income Tier: 1990-2010 
Source: World Bank, Author’s Calculations 
29 
 
Telecommunications 
 
The amount of telecommunications-related assets has exploded since 1990, although 
growth leadership has shifted throughout the period. Traditional fixed telephone lines grew 
the strongest during the 1990s when cellular phones were just an emerging technology and 
broadband Internet connections were merely in the development phase. During the 2000s 
growth in the telecommunications industry was spurred by the need to build out networks 
for cellular telephones, with many countries seeing the number of cellphone subscriptions 
dwarf the number of fixed telephone lines in operation by the beginning of this decade. By 
the beginning of the 2010s, the number of broadband subscriptions began to grow 
dramatically and spur a new round of asset buildup to facilitate this dramatic increase in 
demand on the existing telecommunications network. The composition of growth 
leadership differed dramatically within the three types of telecommunication assets. 
 
Somewhat unexpectedly given that there are nearly six cell phone subscriptions for every 
fixed telephone line in middle income countries compared to a little under three in high 
income countries, middle income countries were the primary growth drivers in the build 
out in telecommunication assets related to new fixed telephone lines. High income 
countries represented a little over one-fifth of the growth in total fixed telephone lines 
during this two-plus decade period, although the number of fixed telephone lines in 
operation actually declined from over 600 million lines in 2000 to just 572 million lines in 
2010. The United States drove the major trends during both periods, with annual average 
growth of 3.6% during the 1990s-plus and an annual average contraction of 2.6% during 
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the 2000s-plus. Western Europe’s growth and contraction over the two periods was less 
dramatic than the one seen in the US, while Japan’s fixed telephone line connection base 
grew moderately during both periods. 
 
In fact, middle income countries comprised nearly 80% of the growth in new fixed 
telephone line-related assets, with annual growth of nearly 11% between 1990 and 2010. 
Unsurprisingly, there was a much faster adoption of these assets in the 1990s-plus (15.7% 
per year) than in the 2000s-plus (5.9% per year) before cellular phone networks were built 
out in many developing economies. China and other middle income Asian countries 
excluding India alone represented over half of total growth in new fixed telephone lines. 
Middle income Middle Eastern and North African countries also rapidly built out their 
fixed telephone networks during this period. The per year growth in fixed telephone lines 
was the fastest in low income countries during the 2000s-plus, but their low base of 
installed lines meant that these countries represented just 1% of the growth in such assets 
over the two-decade-plus period. 
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Growth leadership in the build out of 
telecommunications networks due to 
new mobile phone subscriptions was 
also driven by middle income 
countries between 1990 and 2010, but 
high income countries and low 
income countries comprised larger 
shares of growth in cell phone-related 
assets than they did with fixed 
telephone lines. Among high income 
countries, Western European countries were the primary growth driver of new cell phone-
related network assets. The region represented 9.5% of the total global growth in new cell 
phone-related assets between 1990 and 2010, and the region had over 500 million 
subscriptions by the beginning of this decade. Japan and other high income Asian 
economies also grew their mobile phone-related assets at a rapid clip during these two-plus 
decades. By contrast, the United States represented just 5.3% of the growth in new cell 
phone-related assets over the same time period. Canada also grew its cell phone network 
at a below average rate during this time period despite being home to one of the most 
prominent cell phone makers, Research in Motion. 
 
Similar to many forms of infrastructure assets, middle income countries drove a decided 
majority of growth in cell phone subscriptions—here over two-thirds of new 
subscriptions—but the composition of growth within regions was much more egalitarian 
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Figure 9. Ratio of Mobile Phone Subscriptions to Fixed Telephone 
Lines by Income Tier: 1995-2010 
 
Figure 45. Cumulative Share of Growth in New Broadband 
Connections by Income Tier: 2001-2010 Figure 946. Ratio of Mobile 
Phone Subscriptions to Fixed Telephone Lines by Income Tier: 1995-
2010 
 
Figure 47. Cumulative Share of Growth in New Broadband 
Connections by Income Tier: 2001-2010 
 
Figure 48. Growth Rate of Private Investment and Public 
Infrastructure Spending in Developing Economies: 1994-2010 
Figure 49. Cumulative Share of Growth in New Broadband 
Connections by Income Tier: 2001-2010 Figure 950. Ratio of Mobile 
Phone Subscriptions to Fixed Telephone Lines by Income Tier: 1995-
2010 
 
Figure 51. Cumulative Share of Growth in New Broadband 
Connections by Income Tier: 2001-2010 Figure 952. Ratio of Mobile 
Phon  Subscripti ns o Fixed Telephone Lines by Income Tier: 1995-
2010 
Source: World Bank, Author’s Calculations 
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than it was for other types of assets. Whereas China comprised between 28% and 42% of 
practically all other forms of infrastructure assets discussed so far with the exception of 
new rail lines1, the country was responsible for just 16% of new cell phone subscriptions 
around the world between 1990 and 2010. Growth was strong in other middle income 
countries, with India and other middle Asian income countries, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines, representing 14.3% and 14.2%, respectively, of total global 
growth during this period. Brazilian growth was stronger than other middle income Latin 
American countries, while growth was above average in middle income Eastern European, 
Middle Eastern and North African, and Sub Saharan African countries. Low income 
countries represented a much more robust 5.1% of total global growth in new cell phone 
subscriptions, and there were nearly thirty cell phone subscriptions for every fixed 
telephone connection at the beginning of this decade in low income countries. 
 
Unlike many other forms of infrastructure assets, high income countries were responsible 
for a majority share of the growth in installed broadband connections rather than middle 
income countries. In total, 57% of new broadband connections between 1990 and 2010 
were installed in high income countries. Western Europe was responsible for the largest 
share of new assets, as this region represented in excess of one-fifth of total growth in these 
assets globally during the time period. The US, by contrast, represented a little under 16% 
                                                          
1 Even with new rail lines, it is quite possible that China’s growth is understated by official World Bank 
figures, as certain Chinese railroad agencies list the kilometers in operation in excess of 90,000, although 
official World Bank figures are used in this report. 
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and Japan comprised a little over 6%. Other high income Asian economies also grew their 
broadband networks at an above average rate during this time period. 
 
 China dominated the growth in 
broadband connections among middle 
income economies between 1990 and 
2010. The country alone represented 
nearly three-fifths of total growth in 
broadband connections during this 
time period. India was a relative 
laggard, especially compared to its 
rapid adoption of new cell phone 
subscriptions, and the country did not 
even have 10 million broadband connections by the end of the last decade. Among other 
middle income regions, other middle income Asian economies and Middle Eastern and 
North African economies grew at strong rates. Low income countries represented just 
under 2% of growth in new broadband connections globally.  
 
Infrastructure Asset Growth and Private Investment 
 
The surge in the growth of infrastructure assets in the developing world—a large majority 
of which were built by public entities based on a comparison of the growth in total 
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Figure 59. Growth Rate of Private Investment and Public 
Infrastructure Spending in Developing Economies: 1994-2010 
Figure 60. Cumulative Share of Growth in New Broadband 
Connections by Income Tier: 2001-2010 
Source: World Bank, Author’s Calculations 
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infrastructure assets and privatization investment flows in these sectors—occurred during 
a period of structurally declining gross capital stock growth rates in the advanced world 
and accelerating gross capital stock growth rates in the developing world. While the global 
gross capital stock growth rate has been decelerating in real terms for three decades, it 
accelerated dramatically in developing countries. The real gross capital stock growth rate 
in the advanced world went from 3.8% during the 1980s to 3.2% during the 1990s and 
2.7% during the 2000s. By contrast, after declining to a growth rate of 3.9% during the 
1990s following a growth rate of 4.3% during the 1980s, the real gross capital stock growth 
rate of developing economies surged to 5.5% during the 2000s. Furthermore, for all low 
income countries, the real growth rate for private capital stock accelerated from 5.3% 
during the 1990s to 6.4% during the 2000s. For lower middle income countries, the growth 
rate acceleration was less pronounced, but the real private gross capital stock grew by 7.4% 
during the 2000s compared to 6.7% during the 1990s.  
 
Infrastructure asset growth and private investment2 growth in developing economies had 
similar growth trajectories during the 1990s-plus and the 2000s-plus. Between 1990 and 
2000, the private sector’s gross fixed capital formation share of GDP averaged 15.2% for 
the developing countries where data was available. During the next ten years, this figure 
jumped to 16.7%. Given that GDP growth accelerated in the 2000s-plus, and assuming that 
the private sector share figure for available countries is representative of low and middle 
                                                          
2 In this study, there is no differentiation between foreign direct private investment and endogenous 
private investment. While material amounts of FDI might reduce the domestic profitability of total private 
investment, the simplifying assumption is that both domestic and foreign private investment receive 
similar returns to growth. 
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income countries as a whole, this implies that private sector gross fixed capital formation 
went from growing under 6% per year in nominal terms during the 1990s-plus to 14.5% 
during the 2000s-plus. Similarly, based on per unit pricing valuations by leading non-
governmental organizations such as the World Bank and based on private sector investment 
volumes in infrastructure projects in 
low and middle income economies3, 
public sector infrastructure assets—
which represented between 93% and 
99% of total infrastructure assets in 
these economies over these two-plus 
decades—grew by 3.6% per year 
between 1991 and 2000 before 
jumping to 13.4% per year between 
2000 and 2010 in nominal US dollar 
terms.4 
 
The comparisons become increasingly interesting when broken down by specific income 
groups within developing economies. The relationship between the timing of growth in the 
level of the public infrastructure stock and growth in the private capital stock, including 
                                                          
3 For this derivation, see Appendices A, B, and C 
4 This portion of the study uses nominal terms due to the limitations of available data for public-private 
infrastructure spending by developing countries. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyze private and public capital 
stocks in real terms, but it should be noted that inflation consistently declined during the 1990s and 2000s 
in developing economies, so it is not a factor that caused the acceleration in capital stock growth rates 
during the 2000s relative to the 1990s. 
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Figure 61. Ratio of Advanced Economy Domestic Credit to the 
Private Sector Compared to Developing Economy: 1960-2012 
Figure 62. Growth Rate of Private Investment and Public 
Infrastructure Spending in Developing Economies: 1994-2010 
 
Figure 63. Ratio of Advanced Economy Domestic Credit to the 
Private Sector Compared to Developing Economy: 1960-2012 
Figure 64. Growth Rate of Private Investment and Public 
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Figure 65. Ratio of Advanced Economy Domestic Credit to the 
Private Sector Compared to Developing Economy: 1960-2012 
Figure 66. Growth Rate of Private Investment and Public 
Infrastructure Spending in Developing Economies: 1994-2010 
Source: World Bank, IMF, Eurostat, BEA, EIA, Author’s Calculations 
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residential housing stock, is of particular interest because of possible indications of a causal 
relationship between the two series. While low income countries display a relatively 
synchronized relationship between growth in the private capital stock and public 
infrastructure capital stocks, both lower and upper middle income countries indicate that 
there is a leading relationship between growth in the public infrastructure capital stock and 
growth in the private capital stock. For both lower and upper middle income countries, the 
correlation between three-year moving average annual growth rates of public infrastructure 
capital stocks and private capital stocks is strongest when there is a two year lead between 
increases in the public infrastructure capital stock and the future values of private capital 
stock. When all developing countries are controlled for, the correlation between the two 
data series is above 90% for both two and three year lags of public infrastructure capital 
stock and the private capital stock, and the correlation is above 80% for both one year and 
four year lags as well. 
Table 1. Correlation between Public Infrastructure Capital Stock and Private Capital Stock Growth Rates among 
Developing Countries over Three Year Periods by Public Infrastructure Capital Stock Lag: 1993-2010 
Public Capital 
Stock Lag 
Low 
Income 
Lower 
Middle 
Upper 
Middle 
Developing 
Countries 
Simultaneous 87% 75% 51% 61% 
One Year 86% 90% 77% 84% 
Two Year 82% 94% 89% 95% 
Three Year 74% 87% 86% 92% 
Four Year 63% 71% 74% 80% 
Five Year 48% 41% 49% 55% 
Source: World Bank, IMF, Eurostat, BEA, EIA, Author’s Calculations 
 
All three developing country income groups showed an acceleration in public infrastructure 
capital stock and private capital stock growth rates in the 2000s-plus compared to the 
1990s-plus.  
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For low income countries, the public infrastructure capital stock grew by 2.4% per year 
during the 1990s-plus while the private capital stock grew by 6.4% per year. During the 
2000s-plus, the annual growth rate of the public infrastructure capital stock accelerated to 
10.9% while the private capital stock growth rate jumped to 8.8% per year. 
Figure 12. Annualized Growth Rates of Public Infrastructure Capital Stock and Private Capital Stock over Three Year 
Periods for Low Income Countries: 1993-2010 
 
Source: World Bank, IMF, Eurostat, BEA, EIA, Author’s Calculations 
 
For lower middle income countries, the private capital stock grew by 7.2% per year during 
the 1990s-plus before accelerating to 10.9% during the 2000s-plus. Similarly, the public 
infrastructure capital stock for this income class grew by 11.6% per year during the 2000- 
plus after growing by just 4.7% per year during the 1990s-plus. 
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Figure 13. Annualized Growth Rates of Public Infrastructure Capital Stock and Private Capital Stock over Three Year 
Periods for Lower Middle Income Countries: 1993-2010 
 
Source: World Bank, IMF, Eurostat, BEA, EIA, Author’s Calculations 
 
Upper middle income countries displayed a similar pattern between the growth rates of the 
private capital stock and the public infrastructure capital stock during the two most recent 
decades. The annual private capital stock growth rate in this income class was just 6.9% 
during the 1990s-plus while the public infrastructure capital stock growth rate was just 
7.3%. During the 2000s-plus, the public infrastructure capital stock growth rate jumped to 
13.9% while the private capital stock growth rate also accelerated to 8.9% during this 
period. 
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Figure 14. Annualized Growth Rates of Public Infrastructure Capital Stock and Private Capital Stock over Three Year 
Periods for Upper Middle Income Countries: 1993-2010 
 
Source: World Bank, IMF, Eurostat, BEA, EIA, Author’s Calculations 
 
The strong lagging-leading relationship between the private capital stock and public 
infrastructure capital stock among developing economies demands more rigorous analysis 
in order to determine if there is a causal, crowding-in relationship between the two series. 
Determining if there is a causal and crowding-in relationship between public and private 
capital stocks is the focus of the next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
Part 1: Methods Discussion 
 
As discussed previously, most studies that have investigated this subject previously have 
done so using cotemporaneous values of private and public capital, panel data analysis 
techniques, and growth rates of public and private capital, each of which contains material 
structural flaws inherent in the construction of the model. This part examines the primary 
flaws in these models before introducing the approach pursued in this study. 
 
Models based on contemporaneous measures of private and public investment—either in 
flows or stock—are inherently likely to show a negative relationship between  public and 
private investment. There will always be a lag between when construction begins on a 
public investment project—such as a new highway, expansion of power capacity, or new 
water and sanitation facility, to name just a few—and when the private sector can start 
benefitting from this addition to the capital stock. This is especially the case for non-
infrastructure public investment projects—such as new schools or hospitals—where the 
lag time between when breaking ground occurs and when the benefits accrue to the private 
sector can just as easily be measured in decades as it can in years. Even though it is likely 
that some preparation work by private firms will have already been completed by the time 
construction begins on a new public investment project, there is still the not insignificant 
amount of time needed to fully construct the public project and account for any deviations 
from original intent that occurs during the construction process as a result of unforeseen 
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factors that arise. This is not universally the case as certain private sector investment 
projects, such as new commercial and residential construction, can synchronize their 
construction process with traditional infrastructure projects.  
 
Furthermore, while data indicate that the pool of credit in advanced economies is quite 
deep in terms of share of GDP, it is generally much shallower in developing countries, 
which are the focus of this study. Between 1960 and 2012, domestic credit to the private 
sector in advanced economies as a share of GDP was consistently 2.5 to 3.5 times larger in 
advanced economies compared to developing economies based on World Bank data. Given 
the relatively shallow pool of available credit for the private sector in many developing 
countries, it is not surprising that some 
zero-sum allocation decisions exist for 
the financial sector in these economies 
that reduce the pool of savings 
available for private investment in a 
given year. The key question with 
regards to public infrastructure projects 
is whether the public project expands 
the universe of investment 
opportunities for the private sector 
once the project is constructed above and beyond what would have existed in absence of 
the public infrastructure project. Studies that are based on contemporaneous allocations of 
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Source: World Bank, Author’s Calculations 
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private and public infrastructure flows tend to be structurally incapable of answering that 
question. 
 
Additionally, studies that use panel data econometric techniques when attempting to 
comment on primarily time-series data sets create a host of methodological concerns. Panel 
data was originally conceived for large samples of different entities (people, countries, 
animals, etc.) over relatively short spans of time. The original practitioners of such theories 
employed models with asymptotic statistical theories where the number of entities could 
move towards infinity for a fixed amount of time according to Smith (2001). Many recent 
studies on the subject of the effect public infrastructure projects—either stocks or flows—
have pooled the values of dozens of countries over multiple decades, which runs contrary 
to the original intent of panel data analysis. This is especially so when stocks are measured, 
as in most countries the stock value of private and public capital is decidedly non-
stationary. In such circumstances, an order of integration or cointegration needs to be 
determined for a linear combination of variables in order to make sure that equilibrium or 
arbitrage conditions imply stationarity, I(0). If such a process is not implemented, the 
findings are spurious. While it may be possible that in certain cases this process occurred, 
the text of many of these studies did not elaborate on the process implemented to control 
for such concerns at great length. Additionally, with the exception of instrumental variable 
panel data analysis, most panel data analysis techniques assume an exogenous relationship 
between dependent and independent variables that may not be justified. Given the 
increasing availability of reliable time-series data for multiple data series in both advanced 
and developing economies, time-series data analysis techniques are preferred barring 
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unforeseen factors that make such analysis suboptimal assuming panel data specifications 
and techniques are not modified to account for the presence of data for longer time periods 
for individual countries in different studies.   
 
Finally, the use of stocks as the unit of measurement for both private and public capital is 
preferred relative to flows as it allows researchers to hone in on the question of what helps 
a developing economy become an advanced economy. The use of stocks also allows 
researchers to control for the possibility of diminishing returns once a country’s private 
and/or public capital stock reaches a certain threshold relative to the size of the population. 
Given that much of the intent of researching the determinants of private capital formation 
in both developing and advanced economies is meant to see what allows a country to move 
from developing status to advanced status—where real GDPs per capita are many multiples 
higher on average compared to developing economies—it makes more sense to evaluate 
the drivers of the stock of private and public capital since that provides a uniform baseline 
across countries—when population is also controlled for—that makes comparison against 
multiple countries more fruitful in terms of drawing useful insights from research on the 
subject. 
 
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, time-series methods, stock values of 
private and public capital, and lagged values of public capital are used in this study. 
Additionally, data series will either be differenced and/or cointegration controls will be 
implemented depending on what the optimal specification is for individual countries. 
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While previous methods may have been more appropriate when the availability of time-
series data for many developing and advanced economies was more constricted, recent 
advances in the availability and quality of time-series macroeconomic data make the use 
of time-series techniques possible. Given the superior properties and ability to avoid 
methodological issues associated with panel data analysis, multivariate time series are used 
to answer the key questions in this study. The particular technique used is the vector error 
correction model, which addresses concerns about stationarity and adjusts for cointegration 
ranks within individual countries’ time series. It also accommodates and adjusts for 
endogenous relationships between variables when warranted. 
 
Part 2: Data Sample and Variables Studied 
 
A large share of data for this portion of the study came from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators Database. All values for population, gross domestic product, 
private and public gross fixed capital formation—from which capital stocks were created 
after depreciation rates were controlled for—and domestic credit to the private sector were 
obtained directly from or derived exclusively from data form the World Development 
Indicator’s database. Values for Economic Freedom (“Freedom”) were taken from the 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Database. Values for the Chinn-Ito 
Index (“Openness”), which is a proxy for a country’s level of financial openness, came 
from a spreadsheet located on Prof. Hiro Ito’s personal webpage. Once some selective, 
judicious interpolation was implemented, twenty-four countries had usable time series—at 
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least twenty consecutive years—from which conclusions could be drawn. In total, 660 
country-years of observation were available, or an average of 27.5 years per country. 
 
Private capital stock estimates, which include private residential housing stock, were 
created using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database and 
the perpetual inventory method for the creation of the stock value. The World Bank 
provides data directly for the private sector share of gross fixed capital formation in a 
country in a given year as a share of GDP. This figure is converted to constant 2005 US 
dollars and considered the flow of investment. Although multiple formulas for estimating 
initial capital stock exist, this study used the “disequilibrium” formula due to the fact that 
all countries examined were far from their steady states. The depreciation rate varied over 
time based on the work of Berlemann and Wesselhöft (2012), but generally revolved 
around 4% with the rate increasing over time. The value of the public capital stock was 
obtained in a similar fashion, with the investment flows in a given year being equal to 
subtracting the private sector gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP from the total 
gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP in that country. For the remainder of this 
study, public capital stocks include both the traditional public infrastructure capital assets 
as well as the non-infrastructure public investment projects such as schools and hospitals. 
Private capital stocks, and specifically what causes them to grow, are the focus of this 
study. Whether increases in the stock of public capital is the key question in this study. 
Thus, both variables are included in this study. 
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Population and the size of the economy are controlled for in this study in order to determine 
whether the size of a country’s private capital stock is partially affected by the size of the 
populace and/or the economy as a whole. Both values are taken directly from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators Database. 
 
Previous studies such as Erden and Holcombe (2005), Blejer and Khan (1984), and Erden 
and Holcombe (2006) have found that the depth of financing opportunities available to 
private sector entities in a country is more important than the rate of interest that private 
sector entities pay. Thus, this variable is controlled for in order to determine whether this 
relationship holds up when time series techniques are used and for developing countries, 
where the levels of credit to the private sector are materially lower than the prevailing 
levels in most advanced economies. All values for this variable come directly from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database. 
 
Many previous studies, such as Atukeren (2005), have found that the quality of institutions 
in a country are important in determining the wealth of a country. Thus, this study includes 
the value of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom, which the Fraser Institute states 
attempts to measure the degree to which policies and institutions within countries are 
supportive of economic freedom as a function of personal choice, voluntary exchange, 
freedom to compete, and security of privately-owned property. All values are taken directly 
from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Database, with values 
interpolated between 1970 and 1975, 1975 and 1980, 1980 and 1985, 1985 and 1990, 1990 
47 
 
and 1995, and 1995 and 2000. This statistic provides a consistent, well-regarded route for 
controlling for the quality of institutions over the last four-plus decades when attempting 
to determine whether institutions affect the formation of private capital in countries. 
 
The level of financial openness, which in many ways is used as a proxy for whether a 
country is open to global trade and the attendant competitive pressures such openness 
places on domestic firms, is included to control for whether firms in developing countries 
respond to competitive pressures by increasing their technological capabilities. The 
variable is formed by a first principle component process from variables pertaining to 
capital account openness, exchange rate uniformity, and trade freedom. All values for this 
variable are obtained directly from Prof. Ito’s personal webpage at Portland State 
University5. 
 
Part 3: Underlying Theoretical Model 
 
As Hatano (2010) hypothesized, it is difficult to imagine a country—especially a 
developing country—possessing a surfeit of private capital with just a modicum of public 
capital. Without electrical power and transportation facilities, which are traditionally 
supplied by public entities in developing economies, private firms would be unable to 
produce their goods and deliver them to domestic and foreign markets. Countries without 
water and sanitation facilities would require the citizenry to expend an enormous amount 
                                                          
5 This index can be found at the following URL: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
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of time procuring those services on their own. Finally without modern telecommunications 
facilities, domestic firms would be unable to compete against foreign competition, which 
by and large does have access to such facilities. Thus, an appropriate theoretical framework 
to model the growth of private capital stock over a long period of time should be centered 
on the hypothesis that there is a positive two-way relationship between the stocks of private 
and public capital and controls for potential lagged effects between public capital and 
private capital. Indeed, this study’s a priori hypothesis is based on the findings from 
Aschauer (1989) that there is a crowding-in effect of public capital on private capital 
through an increase in the marginal product of private capital.  
 
The base model utilized in this study is a Cobb-Douglas production function that 
disaggregates private and public capital. It is a slight variation of the model Hatano (2010) 
utilized, 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
∝𝐾𝛽𝑡−1𝐾𝐺𝑡−1
𝛾
   (1) 
 
Where Y measures real aggregate output, the subscript t represents the particular year 
examined, A is a measure of productivity, L the aggregate labor input, K aggregate private 
capital, KG aggregate public capital, and α, β, and γ are parameters.  
 
As Hatano (2010) explained, with a reordering and manipulation of the production function 
in (1), β𝑌𝑡/𝐾𝑡−1 is the marginal product of private capital and γ𝑌𝑡/𝐾𝐺𝑡−1 is the marginal 
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product of public capital. The assumption that follows from this relationship is that 
prevailing interest rates will be equivalent to both marginal products in an environment 
where private and public sectors accumulate capital in a properly functioning market 
optimally. Given that the private and public sectors are charged different interest rates, 
however, it is appropriate to create two separate equations to denote the interest rates that 
are charged for the government (r) and private sector (q), which we compute as equal to 
these respective marginal products: 
𝑟𝑡 = γ𝑌𝑡/𝐾𝐺𝑡−1, 𝑞𝑡 = β𝑌𝑡/𝐾𝑡−1  
 
As Hatano (2010) explains further, if one assumes that the market is able to perfectly price 
risk, then arbitrage opportunities will either exist for only negligible amounts of time or 
will never exist. Thus, a constant relationship/ratio (θ) between the interest rates charged 
to the public and private sectors is hypothesized, which allows for the relationship between 
private and public capital formation to be rewritten as follows: 
𝐾𝑡~(
β
θγ
)𝐾𝐺𝑡 (2) 
 
If the assumption that the marginal products or public and private capitals are constant, 
which is embodied in an environment where private and public capital formation occurs at 
optimal rates, then θ=1. When a country reaches a steady-state environment and in an 
environment where private and public capital is allocated optimally, the two types of 
capital will grow at an equivalent rate. However, given that all countries examined in this 
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report are still developing, it is not expected for the growth rates between the two series to 
be equivalent. 
 
Cointegration Analysis 
 
With the model for the two primary variables of interest created, the next step was to 
determine whether the private capital stock was a stationary time series or not. Given that 
the real private capital stock increased materially in every country besides Burundi and 
Cote d’Ivoire during the time periods examined, the a priori hypothesis was that the real 
private capital stock data series would be a non-stationary data series, and thus require the 
specification of cointegrating relationships with the other variable studied. Not 
surprisingly, analysis showed that practically every country was non-stationary at the 10% 
level of statistical significance when the undifferenced time series was tested for 
stationarity for all three types of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Tests. Most, 
although not all, countries would achieve stationarity after a first or second differencing in 
one of the three types of ADF Unit Root Tests. Given that multiple variables would be 
tested in the final models for the determinants of the stock of private capital in a developing 
country and that there was strong reason to believe that there would be more than one 
cointegration vector for data series in any given country,  the stationarity tests were not 
conducted. If there was only one variable of interest, as opposed to of primary interest, a 
stationarity test would also have been conducted. 
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Table 2. Results of Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for Countries in Sample 
Country 
No Differencing 
First 
Differencing 
Second 
Differencing 
Unit 
Root? 
White 
Noise? 
Unit 
Root? 
White 
Noise? 
Unit 
Root? 
White 
Noise? 
Algeria Yes No No Yes No No 
Bolivia Yes No Yes no No No 
Burundi No No No no No No 
Cameroon Yes No Yes no Yes No 
DRC Yes No Trend yes No No 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Yes No Trend yes No No 
Fiji Yes No Yes no Yes No 
Gabon Yes No Trend yes Trend No 
Ghana Yes No Trend No Trend No 
Iran Yes No Trend no Trend No 
Malawi Trend No Yes no Trend No 
Malaysia Trend No No no No No 
Mexico Yes No Yes no Trend No 
Morocco Yes No Trend yes Trend No 
Nicaragua Yes No Trend no Trend No 
Pakistan Trend No Yes no Trend No 
Philippines Yes No Yes no Yes No 
Sierra 
Leone 
Yes No Yes yes No No 
South 
Africa 
Yes No Yes no No No 
Togo Yes No Trend no Trend No 
Trin. & 
Tob. 
Yes No Yes no Yes No 
Tunisia Yes No Yes no Yes No 
Uganda Yes No Yes no Yes No 
Uruguay Yes No Yes no Yes No 
Zambia Yes No Yes no Yes No 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Once the non-stationarity of the private capital stock series was established6, the optimal 
model to utilize when evaluating the statistical significance of various explanatory 
variables, including the stock of public capital, bank credit as a share of GDP, Economic 
Freedom, the Chinn-Ito Openness Index, the size of the population, and the size of the 
country’s economy, had to be determined.  
 
Given the expected two-way relationships between many of the variables examined in this 
study, six vector error correction models were constructed for every country in this study. 
These models included the contemporaneous7 values for every explanatory variable and 
six different lags for the public capital stock controlled for in order to allow for a delayed 
effect between the public investment project’s construction and any effects on the level of 
private capital stock. Before final models were evaluated however, Johansen tests were 
conducted in order to identify and implement the proper cointegrating relationships. Once 
those tests were conducted and models adjusted to correct for the proper cointegrating 
relationship, where possible, the model was re-run and results examined. Given that the 
sample size for many of the countries examined was relatively small—anywhere between 
the high teens and mid-thirties—many of the models were not able to achieve full rank 
during the cointegrating process, especially when the contemporaneous or one-year lag of 
public capital stock was the unit of measurement in the model specification. 
                                                          
6 Burundi was thrown out given the unacceptable behavior of the capital stock series, as after 
depreciation is factored in many of the yearly results showed negative levels of capital stock.  
7 The way that vector error correction models function essentially entail a one-year lag on the explanatory 
variables in the study, but further lags were nonetheless deemed appropriate for reasons discussed 
earlier in the thesis. 
53 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS 
 
Results for Variable of Interest 
 
In attempting to identify whether changes in public capital either crowds-in, crowds-out, 
or has no effect on private capital formation, a full model had to be created. In addition to 
the real public capital stock, other potential explanatory variables needed to be controlled 
for in order to make sure that the public capital stock’s effect on the changes in real private 
capital stock is not picking up the effects of other variables as much as possible. Thus, 
Chapter 5 will examine whether the real public capital stock and additional potential 
explanatory variables have a causal effect on private capital stock and vice versa. If a 
sufficient share of countries show a causal relationship in at least one direction over 70% 
of the time for at least one specification, they will be included in the final tests that analyze 
the effect that public capital formation has on private capital formation once other key 
explanatory variables are controlled for in this study. 
 
While the results of the various tests for causality generally support the hypothesis of two-
way causality between private and public capital, the results contain enough caveats that 
definitive declarations are not yet formable when it comes to the relationship between the 
stocks of private and public capital in developing countries. The specific Granger Causality 
test being conducted in each table in this chapter is best represented by the following null 
and alternative hypotheses: 
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𝐻0: 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟
− 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  
𝐻𝑎: 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟
− 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 
 
All twenty-two countries that were able to achieve full rank status during the cointegrating 
process for at least one of the six models showed a causal relationship between the stocks 
of private and public capital over the period of examination. Nearly 70% of countries 
showed a causal relationship between changes in the level of public and private capital 
stock in at least half of the models tested for which full rank status was attained. Somewhat 
surprisingly, there did not appear to be a lagged relationship between public capital and 
private capital in these models in terms of causality either way, although far fewer models 
were able to achieve full rank when public capital was either contemporaneous or just 
contained one lag. 
 
The results for the Granger Causality tests determining whether changes in the level of 
private capital stock causes changes in the level of the public capital stock were far less 
conclusive. Interestingly, while the average number of years of causality for the countries 
that produced at least one year where changes in the level of the private capital stock caused 
changes in the level of the public capital stock were equivalent to the average years of 
causality for the countries that produced at least one year where changes in the level of the 
public capital stock caused changes in the level of the private capital stock (both 2.4 years). 
55 
 
Only nine of the seventeen countries that were able to achieve full rank status and pass a 
cointegration rank test had at least one year where past private capital caused public capital 
formation depending on the lag for private capital. Additionally, no definitive relationship 
between the lag of private capital and the likelihood of causality exists. Thus, while it 
cannot be said that private capital formation does not cause future public capital formation, 
it likely cannot be stated with definitiveness that private capital formation leads to public 
capital formation, either.  
 
The specific model examined in table 3 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where the variable being examined, in this case the real public capital stock, Granger 
causes real private capital stock if the above relationship holds. In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains 
previous information on both the private capital stock and the public capital stock and 
𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past private capital stock.  
 
The forthcoming tables in chapter five require an explanation for their contents. Each table 
reports the findings from six models testing for constant explained and explanatory 
variables with one exception. A country’s real private capital stock in a given year is the 
dependent variable in every model with an error correction model rank assigned given the 
optimal rank for a full model with a certain lag of the real public capital stock, domestic 
credit as a share of GDP, population, size of real GDP, economic freedom, and financial 
openness. Each table shows the results of a Granger Causality test of a reduced form model 
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between the explanatory variable and the real private capital stock depending on the lag in 
years of public capital stock. For the fields under columns specifying a certain lag, a “+” 
sign indicates that the explanatory variable had a causal effect on the private capital stock, 
a “-“ sign indicates that the explanatory variable did not have a causal effect on the private 
capital stock, and a blank entry meant that the full vector error correction model did not 
achieve full rank during the estimation process. The “Overall” column indicates the number 
of times a causal relationship was present over the up to six models for individual countries. 
Finally, the “Majority” column has a “+” sign in each field if the number of models 
showing a causal relationship for the specified variable was at least half of the models that 
achieved full rank status during the estimation process in individual countries. 
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Table 3. Results for Tests of Whether Changes in the Level of the Public Capital Stock 
Causes Changes in the Level of the Private Capital Stock by Public Capital Lag Type at 
10% Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + + 4 + 
Bolivia   + - + + 3 + 
Cameroon   + -   1 + 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
+ + - +   3 + 
DRC + + - - - - 2 - 
Fiji   + + - - 2 + 
Ghana   + - - - 1 - 
Iran - - - + - - 1 - 
Malawi - - - + + - 2 - 
Malaysia   + - + + 3 + 
Mexico   - - + + 2 + 
Morocco - - - + - - 1 - 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines + + + + + + 6 + 
Sierra Leone   + - + + 3 + 
South Africa - - - + + + 3 + 
Togo   + + + + 4 + 
Tunisia   + - + + 3 + 
Uganda + + - + - - 3 + 
Uruguay   + - - - 1 - 
Zambia - + - + - - 2 - 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
Results for Other Variables 
 
In general, the full model with all explanatory variables effectively modeled the factors 
that drove private capital stock formation within developing countries. Of the seven 
variables controlled for in this study, all seven caused private capital formation in at least 
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one of the six primary models controlled for while four of the seven caused private capital 
formation in at least 50% of the models tested for which full rank status was attained. In 
particular, when all seven variables are controlled for, the combination of them drove 
private capital formation in 92 of the 101 models tested, and the null hypothesis of no 
causality could not be rejected in more than one year in any given country depending on 
the lag specification for public capital stock. 
 
The specific model examined in table 4 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where the full model Granger causes real private capital stock if the above relationship 
holds. In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the private capital stock and 
the full model and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past private capital stock.  
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Table 4. Results for Tests of Whether the Full Model Causes Changes in the Level of the 
Private Capital Stock by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + + 4 + 
Bolivia   + + + + 4 + 
Cameroon   + +   2 + 
Cote + + + +   4 + 
DRC + + + + + + 6 + 
Fiji   + + + + 4 + 
Ghana   + + + + 4 + 
Iran + + + + + + 6 + 
Malawi - - + + + + 4 + 
Malaysia   + + + + 4 + 
Mexico   + + + + 4 + 
Morocco - - + + + + 4 + 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines + + + + + + 6 + 
Sierra Leone   + + + + 4 + 
South Africa + + - + + + 5 + 
Togo   + - + + 3 + 
Tunisia   - + + + 3 + 
Uganda + + + + + + 6 + 
Uruguay   + + + + 4 + 
Zambia + + + + + + 6 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
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As expected, changes in the level of population were consistently causal in affecting 
changes in the level of the population over the years and countries examined. Changes in 
the level of the population Granger caused changes in the level of the private capital stock 
in every country studied in at least one model specification, and it Granger caused changes 
in the level of the private capital stock in at least half of the models tested for which full 
rank status was attained in 91% of the countries examined. Interestingly, a larger share of 
countries indicated causality when public capital formation was lagged by at least two years 
(between 70% and 86% of the countries with viable models indicated causality when public 
capital was lagged at least two years) compared to just 43% and 56% of countries indicating 
a causal relationship between population and private capital stock when public capital was 
not lagged at all or lagged by just one year.  
 
The specific model examined in table 5 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where population Granger causes real private capital stock if the above relationship holds. 
In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the private capital stock and the 
population and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past private capital stock. 
 
This result largely aligns with standard Solow Growth Model theories that investment 
growth in developing countries should be driven in part by labor force growth in order to 
ensure the capital-to-labor ratio does not deteriorate during the convergence process. While 
these tests do not provide insight on the elasticity of private capital stock growth to labor 
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growth, and the fact that population growth does differ from population growth further 
limits the definitiveness of these findings as a referendum on the validity of Solow Growth 
Models, they do provide weak evidence that there is some underlying truth to these models. 
 
Table 5. Results for Tests of Whether Population Causes Changes in the Level of the 
Private Capital Stock by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + + 4 + 
Bolivia   + + + + 4 + 
Cameroon   + -   1 + 
Cote d’Ivoire + + + -   3 + 
DRC - - - + - - 1 - 
Fiji   + + - - 2 + 
Ghana   + + + - 3 + 
Iran - - + - + + 3 + 
Malawi - - - + - - 1 - 
Malaysia   + + + + 4 + 
Mexico   + + + + 4 + 
Morocco - - + + + + 4 + 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines + + + + + + 6 + 
Sierra Leone   + + + + 4 + 
South Africa + + + + + + 6 + 
Togo   + + + - 3 + 
Tunisia   + + + + 4 + 
Uganda + + + + + + 6 + 
Uruguay   + - + + 3 + 
Zambia + + - + - - 3 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
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Institutions also appear to affect private capital formation in developing countries. The 
“Freedom” index was causal in at least one of the six public capital specification models 
in 91% of the countries which had functioning models. The only two countries where 
institutions did not Granger cause private capital formation were Fiji and Sierra Leone. 
Additionally, the Freedom index variable was causal at least half the time in individual 
countries in 77% of the countries examined in this study in which full rank status was 
attained. 
 
The specific model examined in table 6 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where institutions Granger cause real private capital stock if the above relationship holds. 
In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the private capital stock and the 
institutions and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past private capital stock. 
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Table 6. Results for Tests of Whether Institutions Cause Changes in the Level of Private 
Capital Stock by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + + 4 + 
Bolivia   + - + + 3 + 
Cameroon   - +   1 + 
Cote d’Ivoire + - + -   2 + 
DRC + + + + + + 6 + 
Fiji   - - - - 0 - 
Ghana   - + - - 1 - 
Iran + - + + + + 5 + 
Malawi - - + + + + 4 + 
Malaysia   + + + + 4 + 
Mexico   + + + + 4 + 
Morocco - - + + + + 4 + 
Nicaragua   + - + + 3 + 
Pakistan   - + - - 1 - 
Philippines + + + - + + 5 + 
Sierra Leone   - - - - 0 - 
South Africa + + - + - - 3 + 
Togo   + - + + 3 + 
Tunisia   - + - - 1 - 
Uganda + + + + + + 6 + 
Uruguay   + - + + 3 + 
Zambia + + + + - - 4 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
While not as definitive as the results for public capital stock, population, and freedom, the 
amount of credit provided by domestic institutions to the private sector as a share of a 
country’s GDP (“Domestic Credit”) also gave indications of being a causal driver of private 
capital formation. Domestic Credit was causal in at least one of the specifications in over 
two-thirds of the countries, and caused private capital formation in at least half of the 
models tested for which full rank status was attained in 50% of the countries where the 
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variable was causal in at least one model. Future studies on this subject could be improved 
by introducing a variable that is a function of both prevailing interest rates and the total 
amount of credit in the system as a share of GDP in order to account for the cost of 
financing in addition to the availability of financing for private companies. 
 
The specific model examined in table 7 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where domestic credit as a share of GDP Granger causes real private capital stock if the 
above relationship holds. In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the 
private capital stock and domestic credit and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past private 
capital stock. 
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Table 7. Results for Tests of Whether Domestic Credit as a Share of GDP Causes 
Changes in the Level of the Private Capital Stock by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% 
Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   - - - - 0 - 
Bolivia   - - - - 0 - 
Cameroon   - -   0 - 
Cote d’Ivoire + + - -   2 + 
DRC - - + - - - 1 - 
Fiji   - - - - 0 - 
Ghana   - + - - 1 - 
Iran - - + + + + 4 + 
Malawi - - + - + + 3 + 
Malaysia   - + - - 1 - 
Mexico   + + - - 2 + 
Morocco - - + + + + 4 + 
Nicaragua   - - - - 0 - 
Pakistan   - - - - 0 - 
Philippines + + - + - - 3 + 
Sierra Leone   + + + + 4 + 
South Africa + + + + + + 6 + 
Togo   + - - + 2 + 
Tunisia   - + - - 1 - 
Uganda + + + - + + 5 + 
Uruguay   - + - - 1 - 
Zambia + + + - + + 5 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
The results for the variable for financial openness (“Openness”) weakly suggest that 
financial openness helps cause changes in the level of private capital formation, but the 
results are far from definitive. The variable was positive in at least one of six specifications 
in 78% of the countries examined. However, financial openness proved to be causal in at 
least half of the models tested for which full rank status was attained for 50% of the 
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countries. Furthermore, the variable was causal in just one of the model specifications in 
over half of the countries for which it was causal in one of the specifications. While the 
findings of this study do indicate some likelihood that changes in the level of financial 
openness causes changes in the level of private capital formation, the results must be 
classified as tentative at best. 
 
The specific model examined in table 8 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where financial openness Granger causes real private capital stock if the above relationship 
holds. In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the private capital stock and 
financial openness and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past private capital stock. 
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Table 8. Results for Tests of If Financial Openness Causes Changes in the Level of the 
Private Capital Stock by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + + 4 + 
Bolivia   + - + - 2 + 
Cameroon   - -   0 - 
Cote d’Ivoire + + - +   3 + 
DRC + + - - + - 3 + 
Fiji   + + + + 4 + 
Ghana   + - - - 1 - 
Iran + - - - - - 1 - 
Malawi - - - - - - 0 - 
Malaysia   - + + + 3 + 
Mexico   + - + + 3 + 
Morocco - - - + - - 1 - 
Nicaragua   + - + - 2 + 
Pakistan   - - - - 0 - 
Philippines + + - + - - 3 + 
Sierra Leone   + - - - 1 - 
South Africa + + - - - - 2 - 
Togo   - - - - 0 - 
Tunisia   - + - - 1 - 
Uganda + + + - + + 5 + 
Uruguay   - - - - 0 - 
Zambia + + - + - - 3 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
Perhaps most surprisingly, the variable that proved causal in changing the level of private 
capital formation in the fewest countries and the least amount of the time was the size of a 
country’s economy in terms of gross domestic product (“GDP”). The level of GDP proved 
causal in just 73% of the countries examined in this study, and it was causal in at least half 
of the models tested for which full rank status was attained for just 41% of the countries 
where some evidence of causality existed. This could indicate that the size of the economy 
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alone does not affect changes in the level of the private capital stock and that changes in 
the size of the population is a more significant predictor of private capital stock level 
changes. 
 
The specific model examined in table 9 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where GDP Granger causes real private capital stock if the above relationship holds. In the 
model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the private capital stock and GDP and 
𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past private capital stock. 
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Table 9. Results for Tests of If the Level of GDP Causes Changes in the Level of the 
Private Capital Stock by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   - - + + 2 + 
Bolivia   - - + - 1 - 
Cameroon   - +   1 + 
Cote d’Ivoire + + - -   2 + 
DRC + + - - + + 4 + 
Fiji   - + - - 1 - 
Ghana   + + + + 4 + 
Iran + - + - + + 4 + 
Malawi - - - - - - 0 - 
Malaysia   - - - - 0 - 
Mexico   - - - - 0 - 
Morocco + - - - - + 2 - 
Nicaragua   - + - - 1 - 
Pakistan   + + - - 2 + 
Philippines + + + - + + 5 + 
Sierra Leone   - - - - 0 - 
South Africa + + - - - - 2 - 
Togo   - - - - 0 - 
Tunisia   - - - - 0 - 
Uganda + + - - - - 2 - 
Uruguay   - + - - 1 - 
Zambia + + + - + + 5 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
Reverse Causality Test Results 
 
One of the more noteworthy findings from the study was that the stock of private capital 
formation was significantly more effective in driving changes in the explanatory variables 
than the opposite case. Nowhere was this more apparent than the variable for GDP. In 
particular, whereas changes in the level of the economy caused changes in the level of the 
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private capital stock in just 73% of the countries, changes in the level of the private capital 
stock caused changes in the level of GDP in every country studied, and it was causal in at 
least half of the models tested for which full rank status was attained for 82% of the 
countries. This was largely expected as the link between private investment and 
productivity is well documented. Thus, it should be no surprise that additional investment 
in productivity-enhancing technologies will lead to changes in the size of the economy.  
 
The specific model examined in table 10 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where the private capital stock Granger causes GDP if the above relationship holds. In the 
model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the GDP and the private capital stock 
and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past GDP. 
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Table 10. Results for Tests of Whether Changes in the Level of Private Capital Stock 
Cause Changes in the Level of GDP by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% Level of 
Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + - 3 + 
Bolivia   + - - + 2 + 
Cameroon   + +   2 + 
Cote d’Ivoire - - + +   2 + 
DRC - - + + + - 3 + 
Fiji   + + + + 4 + 
Ghana   - - + + 2 + 
Iran + - - - - - 1 - 
Malawi - - - + - - 1 - 
Malaysia   + - + + 3 + 
Mexico   - + - - 1 - 
Morocco - - + + + - 3 + 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines - + + + + - 4 + 
Sierra Leone   + + + + 4 + 
South Africa - - + + + + 4 + 
Togo   + + + + 4 + 
Tunisia   + + + + 4 + 
Uganda - - + - + + 3 + 
Uruguay   - + - - 1 - 
Zambia + + + + + + 6 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
Additionally, stronger evidence of reverse causality existed for Domestic Credit, Economic 
Freedom, and Financial Openness. Changes in the level of the private capital stock drove 
changes in the size of Domestic Credit in a country in 95% of the countries examined. 
These variables were causal in at least half of the models tested for which full rank status 
was attained for 82% of the countries where some evidence of causality existed. Changes 
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in the size of the Domestic Credit as a function of changes in the level of the private capital 
stock could reflect the phenomenon of better loan opportunities existing as a country’s 
private sector becomes increasingly sophisticated. If a country’s Domestic Credit-
providing entities believe that they are likely to be repaid on a loan, they are more likely 
willing to extend the loan. 
 
The specific model examined in table 11 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where the private capital stock Granger causes domestic credit as a share of GDP if the 
above relationship holds. In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the 
domestic credit as a share of GDP and the private capital stock and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only 
information on past size of the domestic credit as a share of GDP. 
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Table 11. Results for Tests of Whether Changes in the Level of Private Capital Stock 
Cause Changes in the Domestic Credit as a Share of GDP by Public Capital Lag Type at 
10% Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + + 4 + 
Bolivia   + - + + 3 + 
Cameroon   - -   0 - 
Cote d’Ivoire - - + -   1 - 
DRC + + - + - - 3 + 
Fiji   - + - - 1 - 
Ghana   + - + + 3 + 
Iran + + - - - - 2 - 
Malawi + + - + - - 3 + 
Malaysia   + + + + 4 + 
Mexico   + - + + 3 + 
Morocco + + - + - + 4 + 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines - - + + + + 4 + 
Sierra Leone   + + + + 4 + 
South Africa + + + + - - 4 + 
Togo   + + + + 4 + 
Tunisia   + + + - 3 + 
Uganda + + + + + + 6 + 
Uruguay   + + + + 4 + 
Zambia + + + + + + 6 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
Furthermore, changes in the stock of private capital caused changes in the Economic 
Freedom variable in 95% of the countries in at least one of the six specifications. It was 
also causal in at least half of the models tested for which full rank status was attained for 
over 68% of the countries where some evidence of causality existed. Finally,  changes in 
the level of the private capital stock caused changes in a country’s Openness rating in 86% 
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of the countries examined, and it was causal in at least half of the models tested for which 
full rank status was attained in over two-thirds of the countries where some evidence of 
causality existed. These results tentatively indicate that as firms in a country become 
increasingly affluent and sophisticated, they also become increasingly willing to push for 
governance and openness reforms that would result in increasingly profitable operations 
on the part of the firm. 
 
The specific model examined in table 12 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑡| 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑡  | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where the private capital stock Granger causes the ratings of institutions if the above 
relationship holds. In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the quality of 
institutions and the private capital stock and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past quality 
of institutions. 
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Table 12. Results for Tests of Whether Changes in the Level of Private Capital Stock 
Cause Changes in the rating for Economic Freedom by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% 
Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + - 3 + 
Bolivia   + - - + 2 + 
Cameroon   - +   1 + 
Cote d’Ivoire + + + +   4 + 
DRC + + + + + + 6 + 
Fiji   + - + + 3 + 
Ghana   - - - - 0 - 
Iran + + - - - - 2 - 
Malawi + + - - - - 2 - 
Malaysia   - + - - 1 - 
Mexico   + + + + 4 + 
Morocco + + + + + + 6 + 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines + + + + + - 5 + 
Sierra Leone   + - + + 3 + 
South Africa - - + - - - 1 - 
Togo   - - - + 1 - 
Tunisia   - + - - 1 - 
Uganda + + + + + + 6 + 
Uruguay   + + + + 4 + 
Zambia + + + + + + 6 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
The specific model examined in table 13 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where the private capital stock Granger causes financial openness if the above relationship 
holds. In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the financial openness of a 
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country and the private capital stock and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past financial 
openness. 
 
Table 13. Results for Tests of Whether Changes in the Level of Private Capital Stock 
Cause Changes in the rating for Financial Openness by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% 
Level of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + - 3 + 
Bolivia   + - - + 2 + 
Cameroon   - +   1 + 
Cote d’Ivoire - - + +   2 + 
DRC - - + + + - 3 + 
Fiji   + - + + 3 + 
Ghana   - - - - 0 - 
Iran + - - - - - 1 - 
Malawi - - - + - - 1 - 
Malaysia   + - + + 3 + 
Mexico   - - - - 0 - 
Morocco - - - + - - 1 - 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines - - + - + + 3 + 
Sierra Leone   - - - - 0 - 
South Africa - - - + - - 1 - 
Togo   + + + + 4 + 
Tunisia   + + + + 4 + 
Uganda + + + + + + 6 + 
Uruguay   + + + + 4 + 
Zambia - - + + + + 4 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
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Changes in the level of the private capital stock drove changes in the size of the population 
in 91% of the countries examined in this study, and it was causal in at least half of the 
models tested for which full rank status was attained for 73% of the countries where some 
evidence of causality existed. Although fertility rates generally decline as a country’s 
citizenry becomes wealthier, it is possible that these findings reflect the fact that as a 
country’s private capital stock grows larger, it can devote additional resources to healthcare 
which results in a reduction in the death rate that exceeds any declines the birth and/or 
fertility rate for the periods examined. 
 
The specific model examined in table 14 contains the following form: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1) ≠ 𝐸(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 | 𝐽𝑡−1) 
Where the private capital stock Granger causes population if the above relationship holds. 
In the model, 𝐼𝑡−1contains previous information on both the population and the private 
capital stock and 𝐽𝑡−1contains only information on past population. 
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Table 14. Results for Tests of Whether Changes in the Level of Private Capital Stock 
Cause Changes in the Level of the Population by Public Capital Lag Type at 10% Level 
of Significance 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Yr. 
Lag 
2 Yr. 
Lag 
3 Yr. 
Lag 
4 Yr. 
Lag 
5 Yr. 
Lag 
Overall Majority 
Algeria   + + + + 4 + 
Bolivia   + - + + 3 + 
Cameroon   - +   1 + 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
+ + + +   4 + 
DRC - - + + - - 2 - 
Fiji   + - + + 3 + 
Ghana   - - + - 1 - 
Iran + + - - - - 2 - 
Malawi - - - + - - 1 - 
Malaysia   + - + + 3 + 
Mexico   - - - - 0 - 
Morocco + + - + - - 3 + 
Nicaragua   + + + + 4 + 
Pakistan   + + + + 4 + 
Philippines + + + - + + 5 + 
Sierra Leone   - - - - 0 - 
South Africa + + - + - - 3 + 
Togo   + + + + 4 + 
Tunisia   + + + + 4 + 
Uganda - - + + + + 4 + 
Uruguay   + + + + 4 + 
Zambia - - + + + + 4 + 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Note: For explanation of table, see pages 55 & 56 
 
Given that all of these variables meet one of the necessary criteria for being a good 
candidate for having a statistically significant effect at predicting changes in the level of 
private capital formation, they will be included in the final model that attempts to determine 
whether public capital formation crowds-in or crowds-out private capital formation after 
other explanatory variables are controlled for in the model. 
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CHAPTER 6: CROWDING-IN VS CROWDING-OUT 
ANALYSIS 
 
The final important test when it comes to analyzing the relationship between the levels of 
public and private capital stock is to answer the question of whether growth in the level of 
the public capital stock cause an increase (“crowding in”) or decrease (“crowding out”) in 
the growth of the private capital stock. The results of this study indicate that increases in 
the level of the public capital stock have a crowding-in effect on the level of the private 
capital stock anywhere between five-ninths and three-fourths of the time depending on the 
metric analyzed. For the fifty-seven cases where a causal relationship between a 
simultaneous or lagged value of public capital stock and private capital stock exist, forty 
of them indicate a crowding-in relationship. When broken down in country terms, thirteen 
of the twenty-two countries consistently display a crowding-in relationship after the other 
variables are controlled for in the VECM regressions, five consistently indicate a crowding-
out relationship, and five show both types of relationships. 
 
However, of particular interest is the fact that the relationships become much more 
consistent when the value of public capital stock is lagged by two years or more. In the 
forty-eight such instances where a causal relationship exists, thirty-six models display a 
crowding-in relationship. In country terms, 66% of the countries consistently display a 
crowding-in relationship, 29% consistently display a crowding-out relationship, and 
Algeria displays both at various lags. These findings bolster the hypothesis that there is a 
lagged relationship between public capital formation and a crowding-in effect on private 
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capital formation while  a crowding-out relationship is more likely to exist when public 
capital formation and private capital formation occur closer together. Furthermore, with 
the exception of Togo, every country that was able to generate a vector error correction 
model with full rank for at least three different lags with a causal relationship indicated 
that a crowding-in effect between public capital and private capital was present. 
 
While there is a large range of values of the elasticity of private capital stock growth with 
respect to public capital formation, some trends are quite apparent when the mean and 
median elasticity values for public capital formation’s effect on private capital formation 
across the breadth of the sample of twenty-two countries. The mean value of the elasticity 
of private capital stock growth with respect to public capital formation went from 
negative values when contemporaneous values (-0.22) and one year lag (-0.13) of public 
capital stock was included to positive values during the two year lag (0.10), three year lag 
(0.08), four year lag (0.13), and especially the five year lag (0.36). When median 
elasticity values are considered, the positive effect of public capital stock growth on 
private capital stock growth begins being evident when public capital stock is only lagged 
by one year, with the positive effect accelerating when public capital is lagged by four 
and, especially, five years. The results of these models are shown in table 15. 
 
The vector error correction models for each individual country takes the following 
functional forms in aggregate: 
∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 = ∏ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + Φ𝐼
∗∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
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∆ is the differencing operator, such that ∆𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡−1;  Π = αβ′   
 and  are  matrices and Φ𝐼
∗ is a  matrix. 
 
It has an equivalent VAR(p) representation: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝛿 + (𝐼𝑘 + Π + Φ𝐼
∗)𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + ∑(Φ𝑖
∗ − Φ𝑖−1
∗ )
𝑝−1
𝑖=2
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖−1 − Φ𝑝−1
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡 
 is a  identity matrix in this VAR(p) representation 
 
The tables on the following pages are based on the following equations based on 
VECM(1) estimates: 
  Δ𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔(𝑥)𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 +
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
The lags for “x” in the public capital stock variable ranged between 0 and 5 based on how 
many years of lags of public capital stock were implemented in a given equation. 
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Table 15: Elasticity of Private Capital Stock Growth with Respect to Public Capital 
Formation by Public Capital Stock Lag 
Country No Lag 
1 Year 
Lag 
2 Year 
Lag 
3 Year 
Lag 
4 Year 
Lag 
5 Year 
Lag 
Algeria   (0.45) (0.17)  0.81 
Bolivia   0.04  0.32 0.49 
Cameroon   0.07    
Cote d’Ivoire (0.04) 0.12  (0.04)   
DRC 0.13 0.07     
Fiji   0.15 0.17   
Ghana   0.02    
Iran    (0.03)   
Malawi    (0.26) (0.32)  
Malaysia   0.12  0.33 0.40 
Mexico     0.33 0.24 
Morocco    (0.22)   
Nicaragua   1.33 1.00 0.31 1.35 
Pakistan   0.03 0.06 0.10 0.14 
Philippines (0.51) (0.92) 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.15 
Sierra Leone   0.29  0.02 0.33 
South Africa    0.18 0.19 0.01 
Togo   (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.04) 
Tunisia   0.09  0.10 0.09 
Uganda (0.44) (0.09)  0.14   
Uruguay   (0.37)    
Zambia  0.16  0.26   
Average (0.22) (0.13) 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.36 
Median (0.24) 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.24 
Positive 1 3 10 7 9 10 
Minus 3 2 3 6 2 1 
Positive Share 25% 60% 77% 54% 82% 91% 
Maximum Value 0.13 0.16 1.33 1.00 0.33 1.35 
Minimum Value (0.51) (0.92) (0.45) (0.26) (0.32) (0.04) 
Source: Author's Calculations 
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Although the intent of this study 
was to identify if there are trends in 
public capital’s effect on private 
capital stock when public capital is 
lagged, and not to identify the 
optimal model for each individual 
country, an investigation of the 
Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC) 
scores for each country’s optimal 
model is still a useful exercise 
because of the lack of definitiveness of the findings. With the exception of if the lowest 
SBC score was in the first model that achieved full rank, the lowest SBC score was 
roughly evenly distributed across models with smaller lags of public capital to models 
with the largest lags of public capital. That said, there was some indication that models 
were optimal more often when longer lags of public capital were utilized. This bolsters 
the view that measuring public capital’s impact on private capital formation is best done 
with lagged values. If only the optimal models according to SBC scores are considered, 
fifteen of the twenty-two countries indicate a crowding-in relationship between public 
capital formation and private capital formation. The results of these tests are found in 
table 16. 
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Figure 16: Optimal Estimation Models of Countries Based on 
Public Capital Lag Length 
Source: Author's Calculations 
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Table 16: Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion Scores of Full Models Based on Public Capital 
Lag 
Country 
No 
Lag 
1 Year 
Lag 
2 Year 
Lag 
3 Year 
Lag 
4 Year 
Lag 
5 Year 
Lag 
Optimal 
Lag 
Algeria     -28.79 -28.01   -30.01 5 
Bolivia     -46.89   -47.57 -47.73 4 
Cameroon     -41.53       2 
Cote d’Ivoire -37.28 -33.53   -31.95     0 
DRC -37.89 -33.56         0 
Fiji     -49.73 -49.53     2 
Ghana     -40.77       2 
Iran     -13.61 -13.20     3 
Malawi     -40.20 -40.95 -40.35   3 
Malaysia     -19.66   -21.80 -22.27 5 
Mexico         -4.12 -3.56 4 
Morocco     -19.55 -19.49     3 
Nicaragua     -45.52 -45.58 -46.46 -45.36 4 
Pakistan     -23.95 -24.00 -23.88 -23.92 3 
Philippines -23.15 -19.03 -22.44 -22.09 -21.68 -22.60 0 
Sierra Leone     -51.16   -51.80 -52.16 5 
South Africa     -11.48 -10.31 -10.90 -11.31 5 
Togo     -51.48 -52.01 -52.22 -53.18 5 
Tunisia     -30.51   -30.15 -30.36 5 
Uganda -46.62 -42.20 -46.98 -47.05     3 
Uruguay     -41.83       2 
Zambia   -41.26 -39.77 -40.39     1 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Given that a causal relationship exists from private investment to public investment in 
just around one-third of instances, an attempt to determine whether a crowding-in or a 
crowding-out relationship would be misplaced at this time. 
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CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The findings of this research, while preliminary, help shed light on the debate of whether 
public infrastructure investment increases future levels of the private capital stock. This is 
especially important given the focus on how countries can break out of the so-called 
“middle income trap”—where a country reaches a certain level of affluence, but fails to 
reach a level of real per capita income that is commensurate with those present in advanced 
economies. Although the results are not unanimous in indicating that increases in the level 
of the public capital stock lead to increases in the level of the private capital stock, the fact 
that two-thirds of developing economies and three-quarters of total models in this study 
display a crowding-in relationship when public capital formation is lagged by at least two 
years provides important evidence indicating as much. This study is unique from others in 
the fact that nearly two dozen countries are analyzed. While future researchers should be 
able to control for additional factors in order to identify what causes public spending to 
crowd-in or crowd-out private investment in certain countries, the breadth of this panel and 
the decided majority of countries indicating a crowding-in relationship provide an 
important starting point for future researchers. 
 
The most important finding from the first portion of this study was the tightly-linked 
relationship between public infrastructure capital stock and investment and private capital 
stock and investment. Electrical capacity, paved road networks, rail networks, and 
telecommunications networks all grew faster during the 2000s-plus compared to the 1990s-
plus in both high income and middle income countries. Port traffic and new water and 
86 
 
sanitation connections grew more slowly, but still robustly, in both middle income and high 
income countries during the 2000s-plus compared to the 1990s-plus. This strong growth in 
new public infrastructure capital stock during the 2000s-plus coincided with a decisive 
increase in the privately-held capital stock in most developing economies. An examination 
of the trend growth in the private capital stock and public infrastructure capital stock of 
developing economies indicated that the growth in the public infrastructure capital stock 
generally preceded the growth in the private capital stock by two to three years. The leading 
effect was more pronounced as countries became wealthier. 
 
The results of this research largely aligned with previous research in finding some tentative 
evidence for a crowing-in effect between values of the level of the public capital stock and 
future levels of private investment. Unfortunately, the small number of instances in which 
a causal relationship exists between lagged values of private and investment and public 
investment make any attempt at forming a preliminary—let alone a definitive—conclusion 
regarding a crowding-in or crowding-out relationship from private capital to public capital 
unwise. Consequently, the policy implications for this result are not definitive. If a 
crowding-in relationship exists between past values of the level of the private capital stock 
and future values of public capital stock, then it implies that governments should devote 
additional resources to jointly planning public works projects in order to make the 
relationship between public and private capital as complementary as possible as a country 
develops. If no relationship exists or growth in the level of the private capital stock 
eventually crowds out future levels of pubic capital stock, however, the policy implications 
are vastly different for public institutions. In this case, governments should devote the vast 
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majority of their resources to implementing what they deem to be the optimal public works 
investments and let the private sector respond accordingly to the various improvements in 
traditional and social public infrastructure. Additionally, any policy can be enhanced by 
improving the quality of public institutions in order to make sure that any public investment 
is made with the best interests of a country’s citizens—both current and future—in mind. 
Needless to say, further research needs to be conducted as this question is of the utmost 
importance for the development process. 
 
The findings concerning population and institutions are not surprising. The quality 
institutions have long been regarded as important in affecting the development process, 
and this study merely confirms that this relationship persists. The definitiveness of the 
finding is quite welcome. The tentativeness of the findings for Domestic Credit to the 
private sector and financial openness in affecting changes in the stock of private capital 
indicate that internal improvements may be more important in the development process 
than opening up domestic firms to foreign competition. Although some of the leading firms 
may agitate to open economies up as soon as possible, the findings of this study indicate 
that government institutions should focus their efforts on reforming themselves based on 
best international practices so that they can create an environment friendly to businesses 
before they subject their countries’ firms to international competition.  
 
The conclusions of this study are tentative, but—even in their preliminary stage—the 
insights and findings from this study shed much-needed light on some of the key questions 
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researchers have raised when looking at what helps countries go from developing status to 
advanced status. Future studies into this subject will benefit tremendously from having 
access to larger samples for multivariate studies where additional confidence can be placed 
in the findings. In certain model specifications, there were as few as fifteen observations 
while the maximum number in any given country was thirty-two observations. While 
tentative conclusions can be drawn from this study, additional observations will prove 
particularly helpful in ensuring future conclusions can be made with a higher degree of 
confidence. Longer time series will also allow for more tailored ARMA model selection as 
models were limited to a maximum selection of AR(1) models given the short time-series 
utilized in this report. Furthermore, certain variables that were hypothesized as potentially 
causal, such as real interest rates and exchange rate volatility, had to be discarded during 
the model creation process because of an inability to achieve full rank during the estimation 
process. In future decades many of these concerns will be irrelevant, but they will continue 
to plague time-series studies of the development process in developing economies for some 
time. Future research should also explore different combinations of variables for individual 
countries as opposed to broader ranging attempts to make conclusions about the 
development process writ large in emerging economies. 
 
Nonetheless, the findings of this study largely support the a priori hypothesis that, even 
with some lag, increases in the stock of public capital facilitate the growth in the stock in 
private capital in developing economies. This study provisionally finds that there is a lag 
time between when public investment occurs and when the accelerator effect manifests 
itself with private investment, although the exact lag time appears to vary by country. 
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Further research needs to occur surrounding whether private investment helps drive public 
investment as well with a lag effect, as the finding from this investigation are largely 
inconclusive. Building better infrastructure, such as paved roads and power stations, is not 
sufficient by itself to help drive private investment growth to levels where citizens 
approach a level of affluence that advanced economy citizens enjoy. It is imperative on the 
part of governments to create a regulatory environment for the private sector that supports 
their goals and provides a level playing field for all participants in the market economy. A 
deeper pool of credit for the private sector and an open economy also appear to offset the 
investment process, although the solidity of these insights is below those for public 
investment and strong institutions. In many ways this report should be considered the first 
step in the process of determining what drives private investment in developing economies 
using time-series analysis that is more suited to the questions being asked. It is certainly 
not the last. However, the findings of this study do support the idea that governments in 
developing economies should focus their efforts on reforming their institutions and 
providing high quality infrastructure if they want a successful and thriving private sector 
that is willing to invest in hopes of a more prosperous tomorrow. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Process for Deriving US Dollar Amounts for Value of Infrastructure 
Assets Globally 
1. Estimate US dollar value in 2000 of infrastructure asset: Multiply 2000 unit value by 
2000 USD price per unit 
2. Estimate  infrastructure asset share of US GDP in 2000: Divide infrastructure asset 
USD value in 2000 by current USD GDP in 2000 
3. Estimate LCU dollar value in 2000 of infrastructure unit: Multiply infrastructure asset 
share of GDP in 2000 by current LCU GDP in 2000 
4. Estimate 2000 LCU price per unit of infrastructure asset in 2000: Divide LCU dollar 
value in 2000 of infrastructure unit by 2000 infrastructure asset component amount 
5. Estimate LCU price per unit of infrastructure asset for 1990-2010: Multiply 2000 LCU 
price per unit of infrastructure asset by (GDP Deflator value of Desired Year/GDP 
Deflator Value of 2000) 
6. Estimate LCU Share of GDP of infrastructure assets in a country for 1990-2010: 
Multiply desired 1990-2010 LCU price per unit of infrastructure asset by total units of 
infrastructure asset in desired 1990-2010  and divide by desired 1990-2010 GDP 
7. Estimate USD Value of Infrastructure asset in a country for 1990-2010: Multiply LCU 
share of GDP of infrastructure asset in a country for desired 1990-2010 year by desired 
1990-2010 US GDP 
8. Estimate the USD price per unit of infrastructure Asset for 1990-2010-Divide USD 
Value of Infrastructure asset in a country for desired 1990-2010 year by total 
infrastructure component amount in country for desired 1990-2010 year 
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9. Create Real Price Index for change in a country’s real USD value of infrastructure 
asset: Divide desired USD price per unit of infrastructure asset in desired 1990-2010 
year by 2000 USD price per unit   
Appendix B: Process for Creating Estimates of Asset Values 
 All asset values expressed in current US$ terms 
 Pricing adjusted for real terms relative to base years as a function of GDP deflator 
changes in local currency terms 
 Pricing further adjusted based on changes in the exchange rate in a given year between 
local currency and US dollar 
Appendix C: Pricing Determination 
 Paved Roads  
o Function of Real USD GDP per capita as of 2005 (Base Year=2000) 
 For GDPpc<$5,000=$200,000 
 For $5,000<GDPpc<$10,000=$200,000 +(((GDPpc-
5,000)/1000)*$40,000) 
 For GDPpc>$10,000=400,000 
o Per kilometer terms 
o Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 225 
 Railways  
o Advanced economies, ex. Japan-$900,000 per kilometer, including associated 
rolling stock (Base Year=2000) 
 Source: World Bank, Investing in Infrastructure, p. 12 
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o Japan-$3,300,000 per kilometer, including associated rolling stock (Base 
Year=2000) 
 Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 228 
o Middle and Lower Income economies-$250,000 per kilometer, including 
associated rolling stock (Base Year=2000) 
 Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 228 
 Electricity  
o $1,900 per kilowatt of generating capacity, including associated network cost 
(Base Year=2000) 
o Source: World Bank, Investing in Infrastructure, p. 12 
 Port 
o $348 per TEU (Base Year=2000) 
o Source: Infrastructure and Employment Creation in the Middle East and North 
Africa, p. 14 
 Sanitation  
o Advanced Economies: $1,150 per head of household (Base Year=2000) 
o Developing Economies: $800 per connected household (Base Year=2000) 
o Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 253 
 Water  
o $750 per head of household (Base Year=2000) 
o Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 253 
 Fixed Telephone Lines 
o OECD 
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 Pre-2005: $1,500 per line (Base Year=2005) 
 2005-2010: $1,500 per line for 2004 lines plus $1,000 per post-2004 
line, $950 post 2010 line 
 Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 109 
o Non- OECD 
 Pre-2005: $700 per line (Base Year=2005) 
 2005-2010: $700 per line for 2004 lines plus $400 per post-2004 line, 
$350 post 2010 line 
 Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 109 
  
 Mobile Phone Lines 
o OECD 
 Pre-2005: $1,000 per subscription (Base Year=2005) 
 2005-2010: $1,000 per subscription for 2004 subscription plus $700 per 
post-2004 subscription 
 Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 109 
o Non-OECD 
 Pre-2005: $700 per subscription (Base Year=2005) 
 2005-2010: $700 per subscription for 2004 lines plus $300 per post-
2004 subscription 
 Sources: World Bank, Investing in Infrastructure, p. 12; OECD-
Infrastructure to 2030, p. 109 
 Broadband Connections 
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o OECD 
 Pre-2005: $1,500 per line (Base Year=2005) 
 2005-2010: $1,500 per line for 2004 lines plus $1,000 per post-2004 
line, $950 post 2010 line 
 Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 109 
o Non- OECD 
 Pre-2005: $700 per line (Base Year=2005) 
 2005-2010: $700 per line for 2004 lines plus $400 per post-2004 line, 
$350 post 2010 line 
 Source: OECD-Infrastructure to 2030, p. 109 
 
